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Repurposing the Corporation
Through Stakeholder Markets
Lynn M. LoPucki*
Corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) is immensely popular.
Rhetorically, nearly all public corporations have committed to it. But
corporations don’t act responsibly because no system exists by which CSR
can be measured and rewarded.
Thousands of organizations worldwide are engaged in a cooperative
effort to build such a system. After two decades of work, the system is almost
entirely in place. It may become effective in the next two to three years.
When it does, the system will continually measure and report publicly as
many as a thousand data points on the CSR of each of thousands of
participating corporations. CSR ratings and rankings will become credible.
Once that information system is effective, corporations will be able to claim
social responsibility credibly only if they act responsibly.
This Article’s main thesis is that the public availability of credible CSR
information will enable the corporation’s stakeholders and potential
stakeholders to repurpose the corporation. By “repurpose” I mean control
the corporation and redirect its employees’ efforts to CSR. Repurposing’s
mechanism will be the competitive markets in which corporations acquire
resources from their potential stakeholders. The corporation’s potential
stakeholders will, for the first time, know and be able to react to, the
corporation’s level of responsibility. CSR’s popularity assures that those
markets will reward corporations that excel at CSR and punish those that
do not.
* Copyright © 2022 Lynn M. LoPucki. Lynn M. LoPucki is the Security Pacific
Bank Distinguished Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law and can be contacted
at lopucki@law.ucla.edu. I thank Frances Foster and Andrew Verstein for assistance in
conceptualizing this paper. I thank Iman Anabtawi, Stephen Bainbridge, Ankeet Ball,
Weston Barker, William Boyd, Jill Fisch, Frances Foster, Jonathan Foster, George
Georgiev, Jonathan Glater, Claire Hoffman, Doug Irion, Drew LoPucki, Fernan
Restrepo, Mike Simkovic, Leo Strine, Andrew Verstein, Diana Yen, and participants in
the UCLA Faculty Colloquium for comments on earlier drafts. I am grateful to Weston
Barker, Claire Hoffman, Doug Irion, and Diana Yen for assistance with research. I thank
UCLA and the Lowell Milken Institute for funding.
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Parallel reform efforts will contribute to the repurposing process. They
include mandatory CSR reporting, mandatory CSR compliance, changing
the law of corporate purpose, employee voting for directors, mutual fund
pass-through voting, stewardship codes, and social norm building.
Repurposing’s initial target will be the externalization of social costs. But
the corporation’s potential stakeholders — including its customers —
furnish all the resources corporations need to operate. By their market
choices, the potential stakeholders can make the corporation’s purpose
whatever they want it to be.
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What gets measured gets managed.
— Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (1954)
INTRODUCTION
Despite the corporation’s financial success, the corporation has failed
to deliver a crucial part of what people want from it: a stable planet;
livable communities; a safe and sustainable environment; meaningful,
secure jobs with benefits; respect for human rights, and steady
improvement in peoples’ lives. Corporate efforts to serve those values
are generally referred to as “corporate social responsibility” (“CSR”).1
This Article argues that completion of a system capable of measuring
CSR will enable the corporation’s customers, employees, investors, and
other stakeholders to compel the corporation to serve those values. The
stakeholders would accomplish that “repurposing” by favoring socially
responsible corporations in market transactions. Stakeholders cannot
repurpose the corporation under current circumstances because
comparable information regarding corporations’ CSR performances is
not publicly available.
Thousands of organizations worldwide are now engaged in a
cooperative effort to build an information system that will provide that
information.2 CSR is the abstract idea that corporations have a moral
responsibility to voluntarily integrate environmental, social, and
governance (“ESG”) improvements into their business operations for
the benefit of shareholders, other stakeholders, society as a whole, and
the environment.3 This Article refers to the system under construction
1 Although this is not the customary language used to define CSR, I believe it
conveys the same meaning. See Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility
Is Defined: An Analysis of 37 Definitions, 15 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T MGMT. 1, 1 (2008)
(providing an empirical analysis of various CSR definitions).
2 The organizations involved include standard setters such as SASB, GRI, or CDP,
raters and rankers such as Newsweek and Greenpeace, proxy advisers, ESG software
producers such as Bloomberg or Reuters, the corporations that measure and report ESG
information, and auditors who give assurances regarding CSR data.
3 See generally Dahlsrud, supra note 1 (analyzing various existing definitions of
CSR and identifying five key dimensions).
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as the “ESG information system.” When complete, the ESG information
system will continually measure and report publicly on the CSR of each
participating corporation. As used in this Article, CSR is adherence to
the actual values of corporate stakeholders, and ESG is a set of
measurements from which conclusions about CSR can be drawn.
A corporation’s “stakeholders” include everyone with an interest in
the corporation’s success. Along with shareholders, stakeholders are
usually assumed to include employees, managers, customers, suppliers,
creditors, and the communities in which the corporation does
business.4 In this Article, “Potential Stakeholders” are persons
considering whether to deal with a particular corporation and on what
terms.
This Article’s thesis is that credible, publicly available ESG
information, together with ratings and rankings based on that
information, would enable the corporation’s Potential Stakeholders to
repurpose the corporation. In this Article, “repurpose” means to control
the corporation and redirect a substantial portion of the corporation’s
efforts to benefit the stakeholders, the environment, and the public.
More specifically, repurposing would shift the efforts of millions of
employees of thousands of corporations to building an ethical and
sustainable world. Repurposing’s mechanism will be the competitive
markets in which Potential Stakeholders decide which corporations
they will deal or associate with and on what terms.
CSR is immensely popular,5 making a socially responsible image
already a corporate necessity. Rhetorically, nearly all corporations have
committed to CSR. Philip Morris says its purpose is “to deliver a smoke
free future.”6 Facebook’s mission is “to give people the power to build
community and bring the world closer together”7 and Tesla’s is “to

4 Jason Fernando, Stakeholder, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
s/stakeholder.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/72XC-5BZ4] (defining
“stakeholder”).
5 See infra Part I.C.2.
6 Philip Morris Int’l Inc., 2020 Proxy Statement 3 (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1413329/000119312520085906/d832372ddef14a
.htm [https://perma.cc/4R9D-JK6H] (“[I]n 2016 [the Company] announced its new
purpose: to deliver a smoke-free future by focusing its resources on developing, scientifically
substantiating and responsibly commercializing smoke-free products that are less harmful
than smoking, with the aim of completely replacing cigarettes as soon as possible.”).
7 Investor Relations FAQs, FACEBOOK, https://investor.fb.com/resources/default.
aspx#:~:text=Founded%20in%202004%2C%20Facebook’s%20mission,express%20wh
at%20matters%20to%20them (last visited Sept. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V77SU52C].
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accelerate the world’s transition to sustainable energy.”8 Nearly all
public corporations claim a devotion to serving their customers, their
employees, the environment, and the public.9 Virtually none proclaim
the single-minded devotion to shareholder wealth maximization
promoted by leading academics and required by Delaware law.10
This corporate embrace of CSR is recent. To illustrate, the proportion
of large, public corporations publishing CSR reports touting their social
achievements increased from twenty percent in 2011 to over ninety
percent in 2019.11
Of course, CSR’s rhetoric is not CSR’s current reality. Because no
effective system for measuring and comparing CSR currently exists,
corporations can, and do, make false CSR claims with little risk of
contradiction or censure. As Professor Ann Lipton notes, “publicity
campaigns designed to improve the corporation’s image . . . may be just
as effective at generating public goodwill as real operational changes.”12
The public seems to know it is being fooled. Only twenty-six percent of
Americans are satisfied with “[t]he size and influence of major
corporations.”13

8 About Tesla, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/about#:~:text=Tesla’s%20mission%
20is%20to%20accelerate,to%20drive%20than%20gasoline%20cars (last visited Sept.
24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/35XV-TXFY].
9 BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION 1 (2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporationOctober
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD9U-BM4T] [hereinafter PURPOSE STATEMENT] (putting
“[g]enerating long-term value for shareholders” fifth on the list of fundamental
commitments to all stakeholders); see also One Year Later: Purpose of a Corporation, BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, https://purpose.businessroundtable.org/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/9J4G-U75Z].
10 See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?,
99 TEX. L. REV. 1309, 1316-17 (2021) (“[T]he typical charter provision neither
identifies a purpose of maximizing profit nor articulates a broader societal mission.”);
see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1615, 1616 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (asserting
that corporate directors and officers must direct their discretionary powers “towards a
single end; namely, the maximization of shareholder wealth”)).
11 GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INST., INC., 2020 FLASH REPORT RUSSELL 1000® 3
(2020), https://www.ga-institute.com/research-reports/flash-reports/2020-sp-500-flashreport.html [https://perma.cc/W9EK-6Q8T] [hereinafter FLASH REPORT].
12 Ann M. Lipton, ESG Investing, or, if You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD 1, 18 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert
B. Thompson eds., 2021).
13 Lydia Saad, U.S. Satisfaction Sinks with Many Aspects of Public Life, GALLUP (Feb.
4, 2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/329279/satisfaction-sinks-aspects-public-life.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6VZP-8W8X].
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The ESG information system will repair the disconnect between CSR
claims and CSR reality. The Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”), a notfor-profit corporation, is the leading promulgator of CSR reporting
standards worldwide.14 The GRI began building the ESG information
system in 1997.15 After twenty-four years, the ESG information system
may be within a few years of effectiveness. When the system is effective,
each participating corporation will periodically and publicly report
about a thousand standardized and audited measurements of their CSR
performances.16 Hundreds of independent organizations will rate and
rank those performances transparently,17 and intermediaries will
integrate the ratings and rankings into decision-support software for use
by the Potential Stakeholders.18
The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), also a nonprofit corporation, is a U.S.-based challenger to the European-based
GRI. SASB views the ESG information system narrowly, as a response
to investors’ demands for the information they need to assess
corporations’ sustainability. The GRI views the ESG information
system’s purpose broadly, to include providing information to
stakeholders and the public.19 Repurposing could occur under the SASB

14 INV. RESP. RSCH. CTR. INST. & SUSTAINABLE INVS. INST., STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY AND
INTEGRATED REPORTING 2018, at 31 (2018), https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/
IIRCiResearchDocuments/2018/11/2018-SP-500-Integrated-Reporting-FINAL-November2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BRN-K38V] (“GRI remains the most used reporting
framework for sustainability reports, with 60 percent of all reporters referencing or
following it.”); see also ALL. FOR CORP. TRANSPARENCY, 2019 RESEARCH REPORT 34 (2019)
(reporting that 54.1 percent of non-financial statements examined specified that they
relied on Global Reporting Initiative, higher than any other standards or group of
standards); Cynthia A. Williams, The Global Reporting Initiative, Transnational
Corporate Accountability, and Global Regulatory Counter-Currents, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L,
TRANSNAT’L, & COMPAR. L. 67, 74 (2016) (“GRI’s voluntary framework for ESG
reporting has emerged as the global benchmark.”).
15 See Our Mission and History, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/aboutgri/mission-history/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/53C5-6LKR].
16 See generally, e.g., GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, CONSOLIDATED SET OF GRI
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS (2020) [hereinafter CONSOLIDATED GRI
STANDARDS] (specifying standards that generate more than a thousand data points).
17 See CHRISTINA WONG & ERIKA PETROY, SUSTAINABILITY, RATE THE RATERS 2020:
INVESTOR SURVEY AND INTERVIEW RESULTS 6 (2020), https://www.sustainability.com/
globalassets/sustainability.com/thinking/pdfs/sustainability-ratetheraters2020-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/472R-JS75] (“The number of ESG standards and frameworks . . . has
expanded, with 600+ ESG ratings and ranking existing globally as of 2018 and
continuing to grow since.”).
18 See infra Part I.A.
19 See infra Part I.B.1.
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view or the GRI view, but would be more likely and more extensive
under the GRI view.
Although the ESG information system is not yet functional, nearly all
of its elements are in place.20 SASB, GRI, and other organizations have
promulgated comprehensive, high-quality standards for measuring ESG
performance.21 Some corporations are already measuring and reporting
to those standards.22 Some of those corporations subject their ESG data
to external audit in order to increase their credibility.23 Hundreds of forprofit and not-for profit organizations rate or rank corporate CSR
performances.24 Software that integrates financial and ESG data for use
at the point of decision is in widespread use in the securities markets,25
and new ESG information products are continually introduced.26
The ESG information system remains ineffective principally because
no single set of reporting standards dominates. Corporations report to
a variety of standards or simply invent their own.27 The ESG data
currently collected are not comparable across large numbers of
corporations, resulting in ratings and rankings that lack credibility.28
In January 2020, BlackRock and State Street, two of the world’s largest
institutional investors, began openly pressuring U.S. public

20

See infra Part I.A.
See GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, CONSOLIDATED GRI STANDARDS, supra note 16.
To access the seventy-seven SASB standards, see generally Download SASB Standards,
SASB, https://www.sasb.org/standards/download/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/SA9E-D42T].
22 See infra Part I.B.2.
23 See, e.g., ALLSTATE, 2019 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT: HOW WE SERVE SOCIETY AND OUR
STAKEHOLDERS 26 (2019), https://www.allstatesustainability.com/content/documents/
Allstate_2019SustainabilityReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/69BT-7P3J] (noting that their
information security program is “subject to both internal and external audits”).
24 See WONG & PETROY, supra note 17.
25 See, e.g., THOMSON REUTERS, ESG DATA ON EIKON QUICK START GUIDE,
https://www.esade.edu/itemsweb/biblioteca/bbdd/inbbdd/archivos/QSG_%20ESG_Data
_on_Eikon.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/WN7B-WWKH]
(providing guidance for using combined ESG and financial data on Thomson Reuters’s
proprietary system).
26 E.g., RONALD P. O’HANLEY, STATE ST., ESG INVESTING 2.0: MOVING TOWARD
COMMON DISCLOSURE STANDARDS 3 (2019), https://www.statestreet.com/content/dam/
statestreet/documents/Articles/1369%20ESG%20Metric%20and%20Reporting%20Stan
dards.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4DY-3EWG] (“In 2019, State Street Global Advisors
launched its ESG scoring system called the R-factor.”); Bloomberg Launches Proprietary
ESG Scores, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/company/
press/bloomberg-launches-proprietary-esg-scores/ [https://perma.cc/7CP6-45VP].
27 See infra Part I.A.1.
28 See infra Part I.A.2.
21
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corporations to report to SASB standards.29 In roughly eleven months
of 2020 and early 2021, SASB’s claimed number of corporations
reporting to SASB’s standards nearly quadrupled.30 A majority of U.S.
public corporations say they are planning to adopt SASB standards.31 If
they do, the ESG information system will be functional within the
United States. ESG data will be comparable across corporations, ESG
ratings and rankings will be credible, capital markets will be informed,
and high-quality ESG information will be in the public domain.
Once the ESG information system is effective, corporations will need
high CSR ratings and rankings to compete effectively in the stakeholder
markets. Because the new ESG information system will make it possible
to assess CSR objectively and accurately, corporations will have to
achieve high levels of CSR performance before they will be able to
credibly claim them.
The corporations that succeed in CSR competition will reap
advantages in the markets in which they sell goods and services, hire
and retain employees and executives, ally with suppliers and other
strategic partners, finance their operations, and seek community
support.32 Those advantages will accrue because people and
organizations seek to deal with, and associate with, responsible
corporations.33
This Article refers to the benefits accruing to corporations in those
stakeholder markets by virtue of their CSR ratings and rankings as “ESG

29 Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, President & CEO, State St. Glob. Advisors, to Board
Members (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/insights/CEOs-letteron-SSGA-2020-proxy-voting-agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/F43R-FYUY] [hereinafter Letter
from Cyrus Taraporevala to Board Members] (“Beginning this proxy season, we will take
appropriate voting action against board members at companies [in certain indexes] that are
laggards based on their [SASB-standards-based CSR] scores and that cannot articulate how
they plan to improve their score.”); Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental
Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/4WESBES5] [hereinafter Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs].
30 The author counted 175 corporations reporting on May 17, 2020, and 536
corporations reporting on January 3, 2021, and estimated 682 as of April 16, 2021.
These numbers are based on the logos appearing on the SASB website. Companies
Reporting with SASB Standards, VALUE REPORTING FOUND., https://www.sasb.org/companyuse/sasb-reporters/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/95U5-MRL6].
31 See BLOOMBERG, NUVEEN & BNP PARIBAS, THE SUSTAINABILITY IMPERATIVE: BUSINESS AND
INVESTOR OUTLOOK 4 (2018), https://data.bloomberglp.com/bna/sites/8/2019/04/TheSustainability-Imperative-Business-and-Investor-Outlook-2018-Bloomberg-SustainableBusiness-Finance-Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9SJ-GY4T].
32 See infra Figure 3.
33 See infra Part II.B.2.
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Benefit.” If ESG Benefit is sufficiently large, it may alone repurpose the
corporation. Even if ESG Benefit is not sufficient by itself, it will almost
certainly be sufficient in combination with parallel efforts to cause the
same changes in corporations through regulation, mutual fund passthrough voting, stewardship codes, litigation, and social norm
building.34 The SEC now seems poised to require that public companies
fully disclose ESG information to commonly accepted disclosure
standards of their choosing or explain why they chose not to do so.35 At
current levels of public support for CSR, the repurposing of the
corporation seems inevitable.
Standardized CSR reporting is most advanced among the largest and
most prestigious public corporations.36 As it develops, however, CSR
reporting will repurpose both public and private corporations. The
scenario in which CSR reporting extends to private corporations will be
largely the same as for public corporations: voluntary reporting to
compete for ESG Benefit, the marginalization of non-reporters, their
voluntary conversion to reporting,37 and ultimately, mandatory
reporting or direct regulation of CSR to deal with the stragglers.38

34

See infra Part IV.
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESG 7 (2021),
https://www.sec.gov/files/amac-recommendations-esg-subcommittee-070721.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G65A-EX7G].
36 See KPMG, THE TIME HAS COME: THE KPMG SURVEY OF SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
25 (2020), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2020/11/the-time-has-come.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EU5R-22WJ] (“GRI remains the most commonly used reporting
standard or framework, used by around two-thirds of [the one-hundred largest]
reporters and around three-quarters of [the 250 largest] reporters.”).
37 Many private companies already report. Novanta is a start-up benefit corporation
funded in part by the Ford Foundation that aims “to form a centralized system for
reporting on private companies’ environment, social and governance performance.”
Chris Cumming, Platform Launched to Track ESG Data, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2021, 5:30
AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/foundations-private-equity-firms-create-esgreporting-platform-11633599002 [https://perma.cc/9TGK-94G2]. See generally ESG
Solution Made for Private Markets, NOVATA, https://www.novata.com (last visited Nov.
17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/U6MD-MFE2] (explaining Novata’s intended role in private
company ESG reporting).
38 The discussion of extension to private companies has already begun. E.g., Jean
Eaglesham & Shane Shifflett, How Much Carbon Comes from a Liter of Coke? Companies
Grapple with Climate Change Math, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2021, 11:12 AM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-change-accounting-for-companies-looms-withall-its-complexities-11628608324 [https://perma.cc/2WUC-GY7F] (“Some investors
and companies want [the SEC] to apply climate disclosure rules to private companies,
too, saying that otherwise it would be harder for public companies to report on
emissions generated by suppliers and customers.”).
35

1454

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:1445

Repurposing will not conflict with prevailing ideologies regarding
corporate purpose. Some leading scholars argue that corporate law,
norms, and economic efficiency require corporations to maximize
shareholder wealth.39 Those scholars argue that allowing corporations
to serve stakeholder interests may impair the corporation’s ability to
generate wealth.40 But, unlike efforts to change corporate purpose by
law, stakeholder market repurposing does not require abandonment of
any laws, norms, or putative economic principles. The public demand
for CSR is already part of the environment in which corporations
compete to achieve their financial goals. It would continue to be. The
only difference will be that market participants will be better informed.
What the shareholder wealth maximization advocates miss is that the
corporation is controlled not only by directors elected by shareholders,
but also by the operation of stakeholder markets. With an effective ESG
information system, the stakeholder markets will become the primary
determinants of directors’ actions. Directors will be able to do the
bidding of the shareholders who elected them only after the directors
have satisfied stakeholder demands.41
In other words, repurposing will not end the corporation’s pursuit of
profits.42 It will change what the corporation does to pursue profits.
Corporations that now maximize shareholder wealth will remain free to
continue doing so, but they will be repurposed along with those that do
not maximize shareholder wealth.
39 E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 36 (1991) (conceptualizing shareholder wealth maximization as the
“operational assumption of successful firms”); Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1616;
Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 177, 180 (2008) (“[C]orporate law requires directors to maximize
shareholder value.”); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 923, 955 (1984) (“[Profit maximization] is not simply the best, but it is the only
operational decision rule that [courts, legislators, and economists] currently have.”).
40 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The
Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363, 394 (2021) (“[T]inkering with the
law of corporate purpose threatens to disrupt the coherence of the corporate form, a
form that has been one of the great wealth generating innovations of the last 150
years.”).
41 See infra Part III.A.
42 Profit maximization is not the same as shareholder wealth maximization. The
classic illustration is Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976), in
which a corporation failed to claim a tax loss worth $8 million (thus reducing
shareholder wealth) in order to avoid suffering a loss that would have appeared on its
income statement (thus increasing profits). Id. at 811. The difference is not relevant to
the subject of this Article. Courts and legal scholars usually treat profit maximization
and shareholder wealth maximization as synonyms. This Article does the same, usually
referring to both as “shareholder wealth maximization.”
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At least initially, repurposing will be a market process, not a political
process. No one need change their minds about anything, and
government need take no action. The ESG information system will
provide the necessary information to Potential Stakeholders, Potential
Stakeholders will confer the ESG Benefit in accord with the ratings and
rankings, and the corporations will voluntarily repurpose themselves.43
Part I of this Article describes the current state of the ESG information
system and explains what must be done to complete it. Part I also
considers the effect of the system’s costs on the costs of products and
services and on the Potential Stakeholders’ power.
Part II predicts that completion of the ESG information system will
trigger a strategic response from corporations that will result in intense
competition for high ESG ratings and rankings. Ranking and prestige
effects will magnify the impact of even small differences in corporations’
CSR performances.
Part III explains how Potential Stakeholders would control
repurposed corporations and how the government might assert
regulatory control. Part III also argues that despite repurposing’s
reliance on markets, repurposing will enhance rather than diminish
democratic control of corporations.
Part IV describes the previously referenced parallel reform processes
that will work in conjunction with the ESG information system to
assure repurposing.
Part V concludes that if ESG Benefit is sufficiently large, the ESG
information system will enable the Potential Stakeholders to repurpose
the corporation. By doing so, repurposing could not only eliminate most
corporate externalization of social costs, but could also make the
corporation’s purpose whatever Potential Stakeholders want it to be.
I.

THE ESG INFORMATION SYSTEM

The ESG information system is the system that defines, collects, and
conveys ESG information from corporations to Potential Stakeholders.
The system’s purpose is to enable Potential Stakeholders to compare
aspects of a corporation’s current ESG performance with the
corporation’s past performance and the current ESG performance of the
corporation’s competitors. As the GRI explained:
Comparability is necessary for evaluating performance. It is
important that stakeholders are able to compare information on
the organization’s current economic, environmental, and social
43

See infra Figure 1 and accompanying text.
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performance against the organization’s past performance, its
objectives, and, to the degree possible, against the performance
of other organizations.44
Comparison to past ESG performance enables Potential Stakeholders
to evaluate the corporation’s claims that its performance is improving.
Comparison to competitors’ performances enables the Potential
Stakeholder to take CSR into account in deciding whether to associate
with the corporation or with one of its competitors. Recall that Potential
Stakeholders’ ability to identify and reward high ESG performance will
drive repurposing.45
A. Current State of the ESG Information System
Figure 1 maps the relationships among the principal subsystems of
the ESG information system. The standard setters who appear at the
lower left of Figure 1 are the SEC and more than a hundred private
organizations that have promulgated standards for CSR reporting or
some aspect of CSR reporting.46 The GRI and SASB are the most
important of these organizations, because each has promulgated a
comprehensive and widely adopted set of ESG standards.

44 GLOB.
REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI 101: FOUNDATION 14 (2016),
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/media/1036/gri-101-foundation-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3DF-L78V].
45 See supra text accompanying notes 32–33; infra Figure 3 and Part II.B.2.
46 Tommaso Motta, Top 5 ESG Data Providers, Surprises and Certainties, FINSCIENCE
(Oct. 7, 2020), https://finscience.com/en/news/top-5-esg-data-providers-rating-andreport/ [https://perma.cc/2JUP-2VCC] (“As of 2016, there were more than 125 ESG data
providers, according to The Global Initiative for Sustainability Ratings.”). Some data
providers set standards by wording the survey questions they send to corporations.
WONG & PETROY, supra note 17, at 7.
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Figure 1. The ESG Information System47

“Standards,” as used here, are definitions of the data to be collected.
For example, this is the GRI standard for Direct (Scope 1) greenhouse
gas (“GHG”) emissions:
The reporting organization shall report the following
information:
a. Gross direct (Scope 1) GHG emissions in metric tons of CO2
equivalent.
b. Gases included in the calculation; whether CO2, CH4, N2O,
HFCs, PFCs, SF6, NF3, or all.
c. Biogenic CO2 emissions in metric tons of CO2 equivalent.
d. Base year for the calculation, if applicable, including:
i. the rationale for choosing it;
ii. emissions in the base year;
iii. the context for any significant changes in emissions that
triggered recalculations of base year emissions.
e. Source of the emission factors and the global warming
potential (GWP) rates used, or a reference to the GWP source.
f. Consolidation approach for emissions; whether equity share,
financial control, or operational control.

47 Reproduced with permission from LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ANDREW VERSTEIN,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 592 (2021).
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g. Standards, methodologies, assumptions, and/or calculation
tools used.48
The underlining that appears in this example appears in the standard,
and each of the underlined terms is defined in a separate standard.
Together, the group of standards instructs the corporation what to
measure, how to measure it, and how to report the measurement. The
measurements reported by all corporations that follow these
instructions will be comparable.
To date, the SEC has promulgated principally financial standards. The
SEC’s standards apply only to public corporations, and reporting is
mandatory. The standards promulgated by the private standard setters
are principally environmental and social. Their standards apply to
public and private corporations, but the reporting is mostly voluntary.
State and federal regulatory agencies require that public and private
corporations make specific kinds of ESG information public.49
Corporations choose whether to make additional ESG information
public and what standards to apply in collecting and reporting it. Public
corporations may include ESG information in SEC filings, other
regulatory filings, and CSR reports of various kinds.50 Once published,
the data are in the public domain.
As shown in Figure 1, three kinds of mediators process the public
data. Evaluators are organizations that rate and rank corporations
overall or with respect to particular elements of CSR that are of interest

48 GLOB.
REPORTING
INITIATIVE,
GRI
305:
EMISSIONS
7
(2016),
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/media/1012/gri-305-emissions-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/57FG-P69X] (Disclosure 305-1).
49 See David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 391-92 (2005)
(“[V]irtually every major federal environmental statute requires reporting of
environmental data on spills, leaks, regulatory compliance, and related information.”);
Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder
Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 499, 564-65 (2020) (“[A]t the federal level, companies
must disclose diversity information to the EEOC, environmental information to
EPA, workplace hazard and injury information to OSHA and to employees, and
hazardous product information to the Consumer Product Safety Commission and
FDA.” (footnotes omitted)).
50 See Era Anagnosti, Colin J. Diamond, Maia Gez, Danielle Herrick, Seth
Kerschner, Laura Mulry, Henrik Patel, Victoria Rosamond, Clare Connellan &
Emily Holland, ESG Disclosure Trends in SEC Filings, WHITE & CASE (Aug. 13,
2020),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/esg-disclosure-trends-secfilings [https://perma.cc/FML3-6LH3] (“[T]he decision whether to include ESG
information in an SEC filing or instead provide it on a corporate website is a nuanced
one that should be assessed with care.”).
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to them.51 For example, an evaluator might rank corporations solely on
the basis of gross direct (Scope 1) GHG emissions. More likely, the
evaluator would define a broader basis for ranking, such as greenhouse
gas emissions. If so, it would include indirect (Scope 2) GHG emissions,
and perhaps take into account the corporation’s industry, the value of
the products the corporation is producing, and other information.
Evaluators might weight measurements differently or combine different
measurements to calculate rankings or ratings. Potential Stakeholders
can choose among evaluations based on their own interests and analyses
or on the analyses of evaluators of the evaluators.52
Proxy advisers are organizations that advise institutional investors on
how to vote the investors’ shares. Institutional Shareholder Services and
Glass Lewis are examples.53 The advice may be based on public or
private data. The voting may be on the election of directors or
shareholder resolutions — including CSR resolutions.54
Integrators provide investors, corporate stakeholders, and the public
with ESG and financial information when and where needed.
Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters are examples. Each provides investors
with financial and ESG information on the same computer screen.55
Investors can combine the information in a wide variety of ways to
guide both their investing and the voting of their shares.56
At present, the ESG information system is incomplete in three
respects that prevent it from repurposing the corporation. First, no
single set of dominant standards define the data to be collected. The
promulgators of the leading standards have agreed to disagree.57
51 “Evaluator” as the term is used in this Article, includes organizations that either
rate or rank corporations based on CSR or aspects of CSR.
52 E.g., WONG & PETROY, supra note 17, at 24 (evaluating raters and ratings).
53 PAUL ROSE, PROXY ADVISORS AND MARKET POWER: A REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR ROBOVOTING 4 (2021), https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/
files/proxy-advisors-market-power-review-investor-robovoting-PR.pdf [https://perma.cc/
24S4-9G42].
54 See id. at 5, 9.
55 See, e.g., LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note 47, at 591 fig.31.2 (showing Bloomberg
terminal with both financial and ESG information visible).
56 E.g., THOMSON REUTERS, supra note 25, at 1.
57 See Press Release, Sustainability Acct. Standards Bd., IIRC and SASB Announce
Intent to Merge in Major Step Towards Simplifying the Corporate Reporting System
(Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/IIRC-SASB-PressRelease-Web-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH6H-H9BD] [hereinafter IIRC and SASB
Announce Intent to Merge]; CDP, CLIMATE DISCLOSURE STANDARDS BD., GLOB. REPORTING
INITIATIVE, INT’L INTEGRATED REPORTING COUNCIL & SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS
BD., STATEMENT OF INTENT TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE CORPORATE
REPORTING 8 (2020), https://29kjwb3armds2g3gi4lq2sx1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/
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Second, the number of corporations reporting to GRI or SASB standards
are inadequate to produce meaningful ratings and rankings. As of this
writing, however, SASB claims that the number of corporations
reporting its standards is increasing rapidly.58 SASB reporting might
alone reach critical mass in the United States.59 Third, no
comprehensive systems exists to furnish ESG information to Potential
Stakeholders other than investors at the point of decision. Those
Potential Stakeholders will have to use ratings and rankings in available
published forms until the software is developed.
1.

CSR Reporting

Corporations publish “Corporate Social Responsibility Reports,”
under that or a similar title, such as “Sustainability Reports,”
Environmental, Social, and Governance Reports,” or “Corporate
Citizenship Reports” (“CSR reports”).60 Because they are not legal
documents, CSR reports are often prepared by public relations or
marketing personnel.61
Because CSR reports are voluntary and unregulated, corporations can
include or omit whatever they choose. Most corporations choose to
report on their strengths but not their weaknesses and to define the data

wp-content/uploads/Statement-of-Intent-to-Work-Together-Towards-ComprehensiveCorporate-Reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXW4-CW6H] [hereinafter STATEMENT OF
INTENT]; INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS FOUND., CONSULTATION PAPER ON
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 8 (2020), https://cdn.ifrs.org/-/media/project/sustainabilityreporting/consultation-paper-on-sustainability-reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF746LQK] [hereinafter SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING].
58 See Carlos Martinez, SASB and Companies’ False Claims of Reporting to SASB
Standards 19 (May 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author)
(“[T]hrough the content and language on its website, SASB claims that the companies
listed in the ‘Companies Reporting with SASB’ webpage are all companies that are
reporting to their applicable SASB standard . . . .”); supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
59 See Rick A. Fleming & Alexandra M. Ledbetter, Making Mandatory Sustainability
Disclosure a Reality, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10647, 10647-48 (2020) (noting that unless
investors coalesce around one preferred set of standards, “it may require an act of . . .
Congress to determine which standards should become the official metrics for ESG
disclosure”).
60 Of seventy-three randomly selected reports by S&P 500 companies for the year
2020, the titles of twenty-seven (37%) contained the word “sustainability,” twenty
(27%) contained the word “Responsibility,” and fourteen (19%) contained the
abbreviation “ESG” or the words “Environmental, Social, and Governance.” Lynn M.
LoPucki, Keyword Study.xlsx 1 (2021) (unpublished data) (on file with the author).
61 Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 924, 950
(2019).
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most advantageously to themselves. Commentators agree that “the
existing [CSR] disclosure system is fragmented, unreliable, and
incomplete,”62 and that the data are not comparable across
corporations.63
These conditions make it difficult for corporations to make
substantial investments in CSR.64 In the absence of an effective ESG
information system, neither the corporations, nor anyone else, can
measure and compare their efforts meaningfully. The corporations
cannot justify the expenditures because competitors can gain advantage
over them by making the same CSR claims without making the same
expenditures.65

62 Id. at 966. Michael Bloomberg, who chairs the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board, stated in 2015 that “for the most part, the sustainability information
that is disclosed by corporations today is not useful for investors or other decisionmakers.” BLOOMBERG, IMPACT REPORT UPDATE 2 (2015), https://data.bloomberglp.com/
sustainability/sites/6/2016/04/16_0404_Impact_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87EDV5PZ]; see also Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the Future of Nonfinancial
Reporting, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317, 327 (2017) (“[V]oluntary reporting remains
inconsistent and relatively costly to integrate into investment analysis.”); Georgina
Tsagas & Charlotte Villiers, Why ‘Less Is More’ in Non-Financial Reporting Initiatives:
Concrete Steps Towards Supporting Sustainability 3 (Univ. of Oslo Fac. Of L. Legal Stud.,
Research Paper No. 2020-15, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3623889 [https://perma.cc/CV48-WZFT] (“[C]orporations are provided with
considerable freedom to shape the debate by making the choice of what they will report
on and how they will report on it. The end product is a chaotic system of financial
reporting, CSR reporting, non-financial reporting and integrated reporting.”).
63 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-530, PUBLIC COMPANIES: DISCLOSURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THEM 32
(2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-530.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2UH-UVEW]
(“[I GAO] identified inconsistencies in how companies disclosed on some of [its]
selected quantitative ESG topics, which may limit investors’ ability to compare these
disclosures across companies.”); Allison Bennington, Recommendation from the Investoras-Owner Subcommittee of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee Relating to ESG
Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 28, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/28/recommendation-from-the-investor-as-ownersubcommittee-of-the-sec-investor-advisory-committee-relating-to-esg-disclosure/
[https://perma.cc/JFR9-PRUA] (“[D]espite a great deal of information being in the mix,
there is a lack of consistent, comparable, material information in the marketplace and
everyone is frustrated — Issuers, investors, and regulators.”).
64 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
65 See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 411 (2004) (“[H]igh-quality corporations seeking to attract
capital have strong incentives to distinguish themselves from rivals because investors
that cannot distinguish high- from low-quality issuers will not pay more for securities
from high-quality issuers. In other words, inadequate disclosure will force issuing
corporations to pay higher capital costs.”).
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As with other information published by a public corporation, SEC
Rule 10b(5) prohibits untrue statements of material fact in CSR reports
and the omission of any material fact necessary to make other
statements made not misleading.66 That prohibition provides only
limited protection to the users of CSR reports for three reasons. First,
the courts tolerate misstatements as “mere puffery or hyperbole.”67 For
example, the claim to be a leader in reducing emissions, made by a
corporation that was clearly not a leader in reducing emissions, would
be considered puffing and thus not legally actionable.68
Second, misstatements violate Rule 10b(5) only if “a reasonable
investor” would view the misinformation as “having significantly
altered the total mix of information made available.”69 Many false
statements of fact that would mislead investors or others in their
opinion of a corporation’s CSR performance would not significantly
alter the total mix of information available to investors.70 Those false
statements would not violate the rule.71
Third, the materiality principle on which securities law is based
works in opposition to comparability across corporations. A small
corporation that owns only a factory might be required to report the
factory’s emissions as material, while a large corporation that owns an
identical factory with identical emissions might not be required to
report them because the factory’s emissions are not material for the large

66

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021).
E.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that a reasonable investor would not view such statements, even if
misleading, as material).
68 Cf. In re Sanofi Sec. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 386, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding
that the defendants’ statement about maintaining “an effective compliance
organization” was nonactionable puffery); Ruiz v. Darigold, Inc., No. C14-1283, 2014
WL 5599989, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2014) (dismissing action challenging
defendants’ statements about animal welfare and employee treatment). But see Goldman
Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Arkansas Tchr. Ret. Sys., 141 S. Ct. 1951, 1960-61 (2021) (reasoning
that “courts may consider expert testimony and use their common sense in assessing
whether a generic misrepresentation had a price impact”); cf. In re Massey Energy Co.
Sec. Litig., 833 F. Supp. 2d 597, 617-18 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (denying motion to dismiss
complaint concerning false and misleading statements that defendant “was an industry
leader in safety” and that “safety at its mines [was] improving”).
69 In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d at 570 (quoting In re Sofamor Danek
Grp., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997)).
70 In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., at 570-71.
71 Id. (providing examples); see Lipton, supra note 49, at 560 (“[B]ecause the
securities laws define materiality and harm in terms of financial impact, there is no
penalty when companies disclose false information about their sustainability.”).
67
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corporation’s investors.72 In that circumstance, a potential stakeholder
seeking to compare the two corporations’ emissions might be unable to
obtain the information necessary to do so.
Some corporations choose, or are required, to report ESG information
pursuant to third-party standards. As a result, the data on some issues
in some industries may be comparable across significant numbers of
corporations.73 But in most industries and on most issues, the data
contained in CSR reports are not comparable. Professor Jill Fisch
provides this example:
[B]oth General Motors and Ford provide differing information
on the same topic: their respective electric vehicle
developments. General Motors describes the number of electric
vehicles it intends to bring to market by 2023 and the number
of miles driven in its electric vehicles. Ford reports on the
number of hybrid and fully-electric vehicles it intends to bring
to market by 2022, the size of its investment in electric vehicles,
and the progress of several specific global partnerships on
electrified vehicles.74
2.

CSR Rating and Ranking

As many as six hundred organizations collect ESG information from
CSR reports, survey the corporations and other sources, and use the

72 George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in
Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 640-41 (2017).
73 See Standards, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, https://ghgprotocol.org/standards
(last visited Sept. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/QPC5-8S3G] [hereinafter GHG
PROTOCOL] (“In 2016, 92% of Fortune 500 companies responding to the CDP used GHG
Protocol directly or indirectly through a program based on GHG Protocol. It provides
the accounting platform for virtually every corporate GHG reporting program in the
world.”). But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 63, at 32 (“Most [of the
thirty-two] companies combined carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases when
reporting emission data, but a few reported carbon dioxide emissions alone.”); Fisch,
supra note 61, at 937 (“Climate change disclosure remains limited due in large part to
the vagueness of the disclosure obligation and issuers’ ability to determine, in their
judgment, that a given issue is not material enough to warrant disclosure.”); Andrea
Liesen, Andreas G. Hoepner, Dennis M. Patten & Frank Figge, Does Stakeholder Pressure
Influence Corporate GHG Emissions Reporting? Empirical Evidence from Europe, 28 ACCT.
AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 1047, 1051 (2015) (empirical study finding that “the
majority of corporate GHG emissions disclosures are incomplete” and opining that “it
is unlikely the information can allow for meaningful benchmarking and comparison
across firms”).
74 Fisch, supra note 61, at 927 n.15 (citations omitted).
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information to rate or rank the corporations.75 The raters and rankers
include the Bloomberg ESG Data Service, the Dow Jones Sustainability
Index, MSCI ESG Research, Greenpeace, the Business and Human
Rights Resource Center, Newsweek Magazine (Green Ranking),
Sustainalytics Company ESG Reports, and Thomson Reuters ESG
Research Data.76 All purport to measure CSR performance, or some
aspect of it.
None of those rating or ranking systems exerts much influence,77
however, because their findings are not correlated with one another.78
The same corporation may be near the top in one CSR ranking and near

75

See WONG & PETROY, supra note 17, at 6.
See Fisch, supra note 61, at 945-46.
77 See Aaron K. Chatterji, Rodolphe Durand, David I. Levine & Samuel Touboul,
Do Ratings of Firms Converge? Implications for Managers, Investors and Strategy
Researchers, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1597, 1609 (2016) (“[T]here is not enough overlap
among the raters themselves in terms of how to measure CSR . . . . Hence, [socially
responsible investment] ratings will have a limited impact on driving rated firms toward
any particular shared behaviors . . . .”); Cherie Metcalf, Corporate Social Responsibility
as Global Public Law: Third Party Rankings as Regulation by Information, 28 PACE ENV’T
L. REV. 145, 196 (2010) (noting that results of a study of ESG impacts on share price
were “somewhat equivocal”); Florian Berg, Julian F. Koelbel & Roberto Rigobon,
Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings 32 (MIT Sch. of Mgmt., Working
Paper No. 5822-19, 2020) (“ESG ratings do not, currently, play as important a role as
they could in guiding companies toward improvement.”). But see Metcalf, supra, at 16567 (citing studies suggesting that corporate rankings might impact stock returns).
78 RICCARDO BOFFO & ROBERT PATALANO, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., ESG
INVESTING: PRACTICES, PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 27 (2020), https://www.oecd.org/
finance/ESG-Investing-Practices-Progress-Challenges.pdf [https://perma.cc/4762-LSX6]
(“ESG scores from major ratings providers (for which data is commercially available)
can vary greatly from one ESG provider to another.”); see also JIM HAWLEY, TRUVALUE
LABS, ESG RATINGS AND RANKINGS: ALL OVER THE MAP. WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 3 (2017),
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4137330/White%20Papers/WP_ZeroCorrelation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6X3K-2Y9E]; Fisch, supra note 61, at 949-50 (providing additional
examples); Berg et al., supra note 77, at 35 (noting that divergence among ESG
assessments “occurs not only at the aggregate level but is actually even more
pronounced in specific sub-categories of ESG performance”); Feifei Li & Ari
Polychronopoulos, What a Difference an ESG Ratings Provider Makes!, RSCH. AFFILIATES
(Jan. 2020), https://www.researchaffiliates.com/en_us/publications/articles/what-adifference-an-esg-ratings-provider-makes.html [https://perma.cc/G7AZ-U9R5] (noting
“the lack of correlation and consistency in ratings produced by the different providers”).
76
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the bottom in another.79 Many users ignore the ratings and rankings;
instead, they work from the underlying data.80
The lack of correlation among ratings and rankings results from the
fact that raters and rankers consider different categories of corporate
performance,81 take different measurements of performance to establish
the same category,82 and weigh the measurements differently in
combining them into CSR ratings or rankings.83 Until a substantial
number of corporations report to a single set of standards, the ESG
information system will remain ineffective.
B. Completion of the ESG Information System
Nearly the entire structure of the ESG information system is already
in place. A large majority of corporations has committed to CSR. GRI
and SASB have promulgated competing sets of high-quality,
comprehensive reporting standards. Thousands of corporations are
reporting to at least one of the standards in those sets.84 As many as six
hundred organizations are rating and ranking corporations on the basis

79 One study found, for example, that one provider ranked Wells Fargo in the top
third of the examined corporations, while a second provider ranked Wells Fargo in the
bottom five percent. Li & Polychronopoulos, supra note 78. Similarly, Facebook was
near the top of one provider’s ranking but was considered below-average by the other
ranking. Id.
80 WONG & PETROY, supra note 17, at 24.
81 Chatterji et al., supra note 77 at 1599-1600 (“For example, KLD and Asset4 rate
firms according to their products’ safety, while other raters do not. Asset4 and DJSI
explicitly consider financial metrics, while other raters do not. KLD, Asset4,
FTSE4Good, and Innovest consider Corporate Governance as part of CSR, while Calvert
and DJSI do not.”).
82 Id. at 1601 (“Some raters measure environmental performance with indicators of
a firm’s environmental processes, while others will concentrate on the firm’s
environmental outcomes. For example, raters such as KLD give credit for products with
beneficial impact on the environment, while others, such as FTSE4Good, employ
metrics that assess the procedures to identify and fix environmental hazards . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
83 For example, Berg, Koelbel, and Rigobon note there are substantial differences in
the weights for different raters. Berg et al., supra note 77, at 19 (“[T]he three most
important categories for KLD are Climate Risk Management, Product Safety, and
Remuneration. For Vigeo Eiris, they are Diversity, Environmental Policy, and Labor
Practices. This means there is no overlap in the three most important categories for
these two raters. In fact, only Resource Efficiency and Climate Risk Management are
among the three most important categories for more than one rater.”).
84 See supra Part I.A.
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of their CSR.85 Software that integrates financial information with CSR
ratings and rankings is in wide use in the securities markets.86
Three additional developments are necessary to make the system
effective. First, to render ESG information comparable across
corporations, a single set of standards must become dominant. Second,
a sufficient number of corporations must report to the dominant set of
standards. Third, integrators must develop and distribute software that
enables buyers of goods and services, job seekers, government, and the
public to apply the ESG information in everyday decision making. This
Section examines those needed developments in more detail.
1.

Standardization

The principal missing piece necessary for the ESG information system
to become effective is an agreed set of comprehensive reporting
standards. Standards are “comprehensive” if they are broad enough to
support CSR ratings or rankings as opposed to ratings or rankings with
respect to a component of CSR — such as human rights. The most
widely adopted comprehensive standards are those of GRI and SASB.
GRI was founded in 1997, developed the first corporate sustainability
reporting framework, and promulgated it in 2000.87 “GRI remains the
most commonly used reporting standard or framework, used by around
two-thirds of [the one-hundred largest] reporters and around threequarters of [the 250 largest] reporters.”88 GRI standards are widely used
in Europe. Worldwide, 2,500 corporations report based on GRI
standards.89 GRI makes the reports publicly available through its
Sustainability Disclosure Database.90 Although “GRI’s standards are
used by the majority of companies reporting sustainability

85

WONG & PETROY, supra note 17, at 6.
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
87 Our Mission and History, supra note 15.
88 KPMG, supra note 36, at 25 (alterations in original).
89 RAJ GNANARAJAH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44894, ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING
REGULATORY STRUCTURE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL 30 (2017), https://sgp.fas.org/
crs/misc/R44894.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q7T-D9F6]; see also About the Global Reporting
Initiative, FBRH CONSULTANTS, https://www.fbrh.co.uk/en/about-the-global-reportinginitiative (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/NR3P-VAN9] (“In total, more
than 5,000 organizations across more than 90 countries have used the GRI Standards
for their sustainability reporting.”).
90 Sustainability Disclosure Database, GRI, https://database.globalreporting.org/ (last
updated Dec. 2020) [https://perma.cc/7K96-ZRNP] [hereinafter GRI Database].
86
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information,”91 probably all the statistics in this paragraph include
corporations reporting to any one of GRI’s more than one-thousand
standards.92
SASB was founded in 2011 with the support of Michael Bloomberg
and Bloomberg Philanthropies.93 It promulgated its standards in
November 2018.94 As of January 2021, about six hundred corporations
were listed on the SASB website as “reporting with SASB Standards.”95
Although fewer companies report to SASB standards than to GRI
standards, reporting to SASB standards appears to be increasing
rapidly.96
GRI and SASB maintain that “[r]ather than being in competition, GRI
and SASB are designed to fulfill different purposes for different
audiences” — SASB for investors, and GRI for a wide variety of
stakeholders.97 In a coauthored op-ed, representatives of GRI and SASB
wrote:
GRI and SASB are intended to meet the unique needs of
different audiences. The GRI standards are designed to provide
information to a wide variety of stakeholders and consequently,
include a very broad array of topics. SASB’s are designed to
provide information to investors and consequently, focus on the
subset of sustainability issues that are financially material.98
In 2020, SASB, GRI, and others reiterated this understanding of their
respective roles in a joint statement.99
91 Tim Mohin & Jean Rogers, How to Approach Corporate Sustainability Reporting in
2017, GREENBIZ (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/how-approachcorporate-sustainability-reporting-2017 [https://perma.cc/SWB4-77TU].
92 I base this conclusion on examination of reports contained in the GRI database,
and the total number of reports contained in that database. See GRI Database, supra note
90. GRI 101, Standard 3.3 specifically contemplates partial reporting. That standard
provides in relevant part that “[i]f the reporting organization uses selected GRI
Standards, or parts of their content, to report specific information,” it must include a
statement “indicat[ing] which specific content from the Standard has been applied.”
GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 44, at 25.
93 Editorial Board, Bloomberg’s Business Nanny, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2020, 3:58 PM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bloombergs-business-nanny-11581975748 [https://perma.cc/
C57Q-UHXR].
94 Standards Overview, VALUE REPORTING FOUND., https://www.sasb.org/standards/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ACU7-CMLB].
95 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
97 Mohin & Rogers, supra note 91.
98 Id.
99 See CDP ET AL., STATEMENT OF INTENT, supra note 57, at 8.
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SASB’s materiality focus is disadvantageous in that it (1) ignores
externalized social costs,100 (2) tailors the information for investors’ use
— making it less useful to other stakeholders.101 and (3) reduces the
comparability of the information across corporations.102 SASB’s
materiality focus is advantageous in that materiality is the “cornerstone”
of the federal securities laws.103 ESG standards based on materiality are
more likely to appeal to investors and the SEC.
Although GRI and SASB claim to have identified “a few companies
that are using both approaches,”104 reporting the same variable to
different standards is awkward and uncommon. A GRI representative
described the alignment problem as it existed between SASB and GRI in
2018:
In many cases, our standards are identical. In others, the SASB
has defined disclosures that represent issues that are narrowly
defined for certain industries. There is alignment work to be
done in the third category where the two frameworks have
similar disclosures with different characteristics. For this group,
we are working together on a technical level with an aim to
create better alignment.105
The Better Alignment Project was a two-year effort announced by
GRI, SASB, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (“CDSB”), and the
Integrated Reporting Council (“IIRC”) in November 2018.106 Its
purpose was to drive “better alignment of sustainability reporting

100 Hans B. Christensen, Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Mandatory CSR and
Sustainability Reporting: Economic Analysis and Literature Review, 26 REV. ACCT. STUD.
1176, 1232 (2021) (“[F]inancial materiality almost by definition excludes reporting on
firm impacts that are externalities.”).
101 See Lipton, supra note 49, at 561 (“[S]takeholders have identifiable needs that are
best served by a generalized disclosure system designed for their interests.”).
102 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
103 BUS. ROUNDTABLE, THE MATERIALITY STANDARD FOR PUBLIC COMPANY DISCLOSURE:
MAINTAIN WHAT WORKS 3 (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/archive/reports/
BRT.The%20Materiality%20Standard%20for%20Public%20Company%20Disclosure.
2015.10.29.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QTB-5439].
104 Dunstan Allison-Hope, Can the GRI and SASB Reporting Frameworks Be
Collaborative?, GREENBIZ (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/can-gri-andsasb-reporting-frameworks-be-collaborative [https://perma.cc/9SB7-JVPE].
105 Id.
106 Better
Alignment
Project,
CORP.
REPORTING
DIALOGUE,
https://corporatereportingdialogue.com/better-alignment-project/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2021) [https://perma.cc/P7DS-BR4V] (comparing CDP, CDSB, GRI, IIRC, and SASB
standards to the TCFD recommended disclosures).
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frameworks.”107 The CDSB publishes a “framework” for climate
disclosure that has 374 users.108 The IIRC is an NGO that advocates for
integrated reporting of financial and other “value creation”
information.109
Although more than two years have elapsed, the Better Alignment
Project has issued no final report. Circumstances have changed. In
September 2020, the International Financial Reporting Standards
Foundation (“IFRS”) issued a “Consultation Paper” suggesting that
IFRS “[c]reate a Sustainability Standards Board and become a standardsetter working with existing initiatives and building upon their
work.”110 IFRS’s power grab is apparently backed by the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”).111 But reporting to
SASB standards appears to be booming,112 and SASB has merged with
IIRS to become the Value Reporting Foundation.113 Instead of reporting
their progress on alignment, the Better Alignment Project’s members
issued a Statement of Intent to Work Together Towards Comprehensive
Corporate Reporting.114 A SASB-GRI alignment no longer appears
imminent.

107

Id.
Infographic: CDSB Framework Users, CLIMATE DISCLOSURE STANDARDS BD. (Dec. 1,
2017), https://www.cdsb.net/cdsb-framework/750/infographic-cdsb-framework-users
[https://perma.cc/GNR2-2BDT].
109 International Integrated Reporting Council Privacy Notice, VALUE REPORTING
FOUND., https://integratedreporting.org/international-integrated-reporting-council-privacypolicy/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/TC9B-S45U] (“The International
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is a global coalition of regulators, investors,
companies, standard setters, the accounting profession and NGOs. The coalition is
promoting communication about value creation as the next step in the evolution of
corporate reporting.”).
110 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING, supra note 57, at 8.
111 See Erik Thedéen, Dir. Gen., Finansinspektionen & Chair, Int’l Org. Sec.
Comm’ns Task Force on Sustainable Fin., Speech at the Driving Global Standards on
Sustainable Finance Conference (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.fi.se/en/published/
presentations/2020/erik-thedeens-speech-at-driving-global-standards-on-sustainablefinance/ [https://perma.cc/V6BQ-9QDQ] (“I believe IOSCO has a unique position to
help and facilitate that process. In fact, IOSCO played a similar role in the development
of the financial reporting, the IFRS, almost 20 years ago.”).
112 See supra note 30.
113 Sustainability Acct. Standards Bd., IIRC and SASB Announce Intent to Merge,
supra note 57.
114 CDP ET AL., STATEMENT OF INTENT, supra note 57, at 2 (“In this paper, five
framework- and standard-setting institutions of international significance have come
together to help resolve this confusion and to show a commitment to working towards
a comprehensive corporate reporting system.”).
108

1470
2.

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:1445

Reporting Levels

The levels of reporting to GRI or SASB standards are difficult to assess.
First, both organizations report statistics for the number of corporations
reporting to any of their standards, not the number of corporations
reporting to their entire set of standards.115 Second, corporations
frequently claim to report to a standard when in fact they merely
produce data similar to that required by the standard.116 When that
occurs, it is usually not in the interests of the standard-promulgator to
correct them. The promulgators are competing to portray their
standards as widely adopted.117 Once a set of standards dominates,
promulgator overclaiming probably will subside.
Two developments are likely to boost reporting levels dramatically.
First, institutional investors have been ratcheting up the pressure on
corporations to report to dominant standards. In his January 2020 letter
to CEOs, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest investor,
made this request:
This year, we are asking the companies that we invest in on
behalf of our clients to: (1) publish a disclosure in line with
industry-specific SASB guidelines by year-end . . . or disclose a
similar set of data in a way that is relevant to your particular
business; and (2) disclose climate-related risks in line with the
[the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure’s]
recommendations . . . .118
Fink added this thinly veiled threat:
Last year BlackRock voted against or withheld votes from 4,800
directors at 2,700 different companies. Where we feel
companies and boards are not producing effective sustainability
disclosures or implementing frameworks for managing these
issues, we will hold board members accountable.119

115

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Liesen et al., supra note 73, at 1051 (“[O]ur finding that the majority of corporate
GHG emissions disclosures are incomplete suggests that it is unlikely the information
can allow for meaningful benchmarking and comparison across firms. As such, the
potential for the disclosure to induce improved corporate climate change performance
is at best, questionable.”).
117 Martinez, supra note 58, at 6 (“[D]espite SASB’s claims that the companies
included in this study are reporting to its standards, 75% of these companies are not.”).
118 Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs, supra note 29.
119 Id.
116
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Voting against or withholding votes from directors embarrasses the
directors and may even result in their removal from office.120
Two weeks later, the world’s fourth largest investor, State Street
Global Advisers, issued a similar threat.121 Since the publication of those
threats, reporting to SASB standards has accelerated sharply.122
The second development that may boost reporting is the possibility
that the SEC will require all public companies to report to a commonly
accepted disclosure framework or explain why they chose not to do
so.123 The SEC’s current language would require that each public
corporation “identify a commonly accepted disclosure framework and
fully disclose all material information in accordance with such
framework.”124 That seems to require that if the corporations report to
GRI or SASB standards that they report to all that are material.125 Most
currently report to only a few of the standards in those sets.
3.

Stakeholder Software Development

Figure 1 shows the role of software in the ESG information system. The
software that provides ESG information for investors is readily available.
The same is not true of software for other stakeholders. To take ESG
information into account, the other stakeholders must retrieve the
information themselves and integrate it into their decision making
processes. That may be practical in large transactions, such as the
purchase of a house or the acceptance of a job offer. It is unlikely,
however, in the large bulk of small transactions, such as consumer
product purchases. The ESG information system will be fully effective
only when stakeholder software that links the ESG information on
corporations to their products and services is available at the point of sale.

120 See Reena Aggarwal, Sandeep Dahiya & Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala, The Power of
Shareholder Votes: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections, 133 J. FIN. ECON. 134,
151 (2019) (“We find that directors receiving more dissent experience negative future
outcomes. Dissent is associated with increased director turnover.”).
121 See Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala to Board Members, supra note 29.
122 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
123 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 35, at 7.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., Glob. Reporting Initiative, supra note 44, at 22 (“To claim that a
sustainability report has been prepared in accordance with the GRI Standards, the
reporting organization shall meet all criteria for the respective option (Core or
Comprehensive); id. at 21 (“Core. This option indicates that a report contains the
minimum information needed to understand the nature of the organization, its material
topics and related impacts, and how these are managed.).
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Some ESG information systems do provide information about
products at the point of sale. For example, LEED (Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design) is a “green building rating system.”126 The
U.S. Green Building Council certifies the resource efficiency of
particular buildings. Sellers who have obtained certification of their
buildings make potential buyers aware of it. The U.S. Green Building
Council claims that “LEED-certified buildings command the highest
rents, while lease-up rates typically range from average to 20% above
average; vacancy rates for green buildings are an estimated 4% lower
than non-green properties.”127
Similarly, Consumers Union, UL, and Good Housekeeping have
certified a wide variety of products for an average of more than a
century. Although UL certifies products for “low chemical emissions”128
and Good Housekeeping makes “sustainability” awards,129 none of
those three organizations report whether the corporations that produce
the products are socially responsible. Their systems facilitate customer
control of products through product markets, but not control of the
corporations that manufacture or sell the products.
The buyers of goods and services can use ESG information about their
sellers effectively only if the information is available at the point of sale.
Some scholars assume that the information will be there without
considering how the system would accomplish that.130 But the system
can make corporate ESG information available only if the system can

126 What is LEED?, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/help/whatleed (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/54WE-GN4V]; see also Mary Jane
Angelo & Joanna Reilly-Brown, Whole-System Agricultural Certification: Using Lessons
Learned from LEED to Build a Resilient Agricultural System to Adapt to Climate Change,
85 U. COLO. L. REV. 689, 736-47 (2014) (explaining how LEED operates).
127 Why LEED?, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/leed/why-leed
(last visited Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9N43-A4YT].
128 GREENGUARD
Certification, UL, https://www.ul.com/services/greenguardcertification (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/A2DH-UR5X]
(“GREENGUARD Certified products are recognized, referenced or preferred by more
than 450 federal purchasers, retailers, green building rating tools and building codes
around the world.”).
129 Frequently Asked Questions About Good Housekeeping’s Sustainability Awards, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.goodhousekeeping.com/institute/aboutthe-institute/a24483277/good-housekeeping-sustainability-awards-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/
K9UR-U5UB].
130 E.g., Min Yan & Daoning Zhang, From Corporate Responsibility to Corporate
Accountability, 16 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 43, 46 (2020) (“The assumption is that the
product, capital, and labour markets will influence corporate behavior by penalizing
poor performers (i.e., social irresponsibility) and rewarding good ones (i.e., social
responsibility).”).

2022] Repurposing the Corporation Through Stakeholder Markets

1473

link products and services to the corporations that produce and
distribute them.
No system currently delivers comprehensive ESG ratings or rankings
of product or service sellers to buyers at the point of sale. Two
additional problems inhibit the creation of such a system. The first is
the supply chain problem; the second is the trademark problem.
a.

The Supply Chain Problem

The supply chain problem is that several corporations, each with its
own ESG ratings and rankings, may participate in making a single
product or service available. Buyers may have difficulty determining
which of the corporations they should hold responsible. For example,
Amazon may sell chocolate manufactured by Godiva from the cocoa
beans of numerous growers in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, some of whom
use child labor and deforest.131 For Godiva or Amazon to provide the
chocolate buyer with information about all of the corporations in the
supply chain is impractical. Some growers may use child labor while
others do not. But a box of Godiva chocolate purchased on Amazon
cannot be identified as containing chocolate from a particular grower.
GRI standards address this problem by requiring corporations to
report the risk that child labor is present in their supply chains.132 In
effect, that holds corporations responsible for their worst suppliers’
actions and incentivizes them to remove their worst suppliers from their
supply chain. That may solve the problem for a product available
through a single source.
Supply chains are not, however, so simple. To illustrate, Godiva
recently received the lowest possible rating from Green America on
child labor in supply chains.133 Godiva sells chocolate through Amazon,
but also through other channels. Should customers who seek to avoid
facilitating child labor avoid purchasing chocolate — or all products —
from Amazon?

131 See generally Peter Whoriskey & Rachel Siegel, Cocoa’s Child Laborers, WASH.
POST (June 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/business/
hershey-nestle-mars-chocolate-child-labor-west-africa/ [https://perma.cc/MLX4-EBPN]
(describing the situation in which this hypothetical is set).
132 GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI 408: CHILD LABOR 6 (2016) (requiring the
reporting of operations or suppliers with significant risk for relying on either child labor
or hazardous working conditions for young workers).
133 Chocolate Company Scorecard, GREEN AM., https://www.greenamerica.org/
chocolate-scorecard (last visited Sept. 27, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9J7Y-WQR2].
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To answer that question, the customer would need to compare the
customer’s alternatives.134 Those alternatives might include buying
some other brand of chocolate through Amazon, buying Godiva
chocolate through one of Amazon’s competitors, buying some other
brand of chocolate through one of Amazon’s competitors, or not buying
chocolate at all. Which would best implement the customers’ values
might depend not just on the CSR of the corporations involved, but also
on then-current consumer strategies for combating child labor. For
example, successively boycotting alternative supply chains might be the
strategy most likely to induce competition to eliminate child labor.
GRI standard 408-1 would require Amazon to report “suppliers
considered to have significant risk for incidents of . . . child labor” and
“measures taken by [Amazon] intended to contribute to the effective
abolition of child labor.”135 SASB’s supply chain standard would not
apply to Amazon. Amazon would be in SASB’s “Multiline and Specialty
Retailers & Distributors” industry, for whom SASB deems “Supply
Chain Management” immaterial.136 The closest SASB accounting metric
applicable to Amazon is CG-MR-410a.1. That metric does not address
child labor directly.137 Instead, it requires that the entity “disclose its
revenue from products that are third party certified to an environmental
or social sustainability standard.”138
SASB’s decision not to require Amazon or other multiline retailers to
report child labor in their supply chains apparently reflects SASB’s
judgment that market actors would not hold Amazon responsible for
that child labor.139 At the same time, however, SASB’s decision would
make it impossible for market actors to hold Amazon responsible in the
hypothetical world in which SASB standards were dominant. The
market would not have the necessary information.

134 See Lisa A. Neilson, Boycott or Buycott? Understanding Political Consumerism, 9 J.
CONSUMER BEHAV. 214, 217 (2010) (noting that gender and philosophy affect choices
about boycotting).
135 GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 132.
136 See
SASB Materiality Map, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD.,
https://www.sasb.org/standards/materiality-map/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/2FQ3-QTDV].
137 SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., MULTILINE AND SPECIALTY RETAILERS &
DISTRIBUTORS 21 (2018), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Multiline
_and_Specialty_Retailers_Distributors_Standard_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X6C-S2RW].
138 Id.
139 If market actors would hold Amazon responsible, the risk that market actors will
discover the child labor and actually hold Amazon responsible would be material and
so disclosable.
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Amazon reports to neither the GRI nor the SASB standard. Instead,
Amazon reports to its own “exacting standards” which are “derived
from the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, and the Core Conventions of the International Labour
Organization (“ILO”).”140 Amazon requires its direct suppliers “to
engage workers who are (i) 15 years old, (ii) the age of completion of
compulsory education, or (iii) the minimum age to work in the country
where work is performed, whichever is greater.”141 Amazon does not
make this standard applicable to Amazon’s indirect suppliers. Instead,
“[i]n order to ensure these standards are cascaded throughout our
supply chain, [Amazon] expect[s] suppliers to consistently monitor and
enforce these standards in their own operations and supply chain.”142
As applied to the Godiva example, Amazon requires and expects that
Godiva not use child labor, and requires that Godiva require and expect
Godiva’s growers not to use child labor. That leaves it to Godiva to
address the child labor problem in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Amazon
states that it is “committed to working with [its] suppliers to improve
protections for their workers,” but Amazon’s supply chain standards
impose no public reporting requirements.143 In the absence of public
reporting, no sound basis for supply chain comparisons among
multiline retailers exists.
Thus, neither Amazon’s nor SASB’s standards require Amazon and
other multiline retailers to report on child labor in their supply chains.
GRI standards do. Ultimately, the solution to the supply chain problem
would be to require all of the corporations in the supply chain to report,
but that level of reporting is probably decades away.
b.

The Trademark Problem

Some corporations sell goods or services in their own names.
Examples include Apple, Inc. and Microsoft Corporation.144 But the
large majority of all brand names are not the names of corporations.

140 AMAZON, AMAZON SUPPLY CHAIN STANDARDS 1, https://sustainability.aboutamazon.
com/amazon_supply_chain_standards_english.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/74WG-6Z2N].
141 Id. at 2.
142 Id. at 1.
143 Id.
144 That is, Apple, Inc., the company, sells its products through “Apple” stores and
the Apple logo appears on those products.
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They are trademarks.145 Consumers see the trademarks when they shop,
but usually do not know the names of the corporations operating under
them.146 The corporations selling under the trademarks may or may not
be the manufacturers of the products sold or even the owners of the
marks.147 For many of the products sold on Amazon, the product
description does not include the name of the trademark owner or the
manufacturer.148
To furnish ESG information about sellers at the point of sale would
require that the information system link brands or product descriptions
to those sellers and thus to their ESG ratings and rankings. Although
the owners of most trademarks publicly acknowledge their ownership,
some do not. For each trademark, an owner’s name is shown on the
United States Patent and Trademark Office online records. But that
record owner may be a corporate employee who holds the trademark in
trust for an unnamed beneficiary, a subsidiary not identified as such, or
a trademark licensor.149 Under current law, it may be impossible to link
trademarks to corporations comprehensively without the corporations’
cooperation. The solution may be to link the products for which

145 For example, Doctors’ Associates, Inc. franchises the Subway sandwich stores.
Doctor’s Associates Inc., FOREST 500, https://forest500.org/rankings/companies/doctorsassociates-inc (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/P98D-KH5F].
146 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors’ Liability when Franchisees Are Apparent
Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis of “Common Knowledge” About Franchising, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 609, 653 (1992) (discussing a survey finding that “only 9.9% of the
respondents correctly answered that most Chevron gas stations are locally owned and
operated, while 57.0% erroneously believed that they were mostly nationally owned and
operated, and 28.0% incorrectly concluded that most were dually owned and operated
both nationally and locally”).
147 Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1099, 1100-01 (2002).
148 E.g., 1080P Webcam Computer Camera, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/
Microphone-Computer-Webcams-Broadcast-Confer-ence/dp/B088LMZZV4/ref=sr_1_
1_sspa?dchild=1&keywords=webcams&qid=1590378682&sr=8-1-spons&psc=1&
spLa=ZW5jcnlwdGVkUXVhbGlmaWVyPUEySlZZMUNYWVBOU1lVJmVuY3J5cHRlZ
ElkPUEwNTM5MDYzMlVCREE3T0hXQVBIWSZlbmNyeXB0ZWRBZElkPUEwNjg2N
Tk3MUgzUUpTVlQ0UlROJndpZGdldE5hbWU9c3BfYXRmJmFjdGlvbj1jbGlja1JlZGl
yZWN0JmRvTm90TG9nQ2xpY2s9dHJ1ZQ== (last visited Nov. 6, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/VQ5E-MNDZ] (merely stating that the “brand” is “FFGY Petsply” and
providing no additional information about the trademark owner or manufacturer). The
mark does not appear in the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark
Database. Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchss&state=4810:krionr.1.1 (last visited
Nov. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/87KD-RN5J] (search for “FFGY Petsply”).
149 See LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note 47, at 57-68 (explaining the lack of
congruency between the public’s view and the lawyer’s view of legal actors).
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information is available and see whether market pressure is sufficient to
compel the others to disclose.
C. ESG Information System Costs
Repurposing may affect the corporation’s costs. Those costs may in
turn affect the prices of the corporation’s products and services. In
addition, the ESG information system will affect the cost at which
Potential Stakeholders can obtain and use CSR information in their
decision making. I consider each effect separately. I conclude that
repurposing will increase the corporations’ costs in the short run, but
reduce them in the long run.150 If that conclusion is correct, repurposed
corporations will not need to raise the prices of their products or
services. They should instead treat the increased costs they will incur in
the short run as an investment that will pay out in the long run.
1.

Cost Effects on the Prices of Goods and Services

Participation in the ESG information system will impose three new
costs on each participating corporation. The first is the cost of
measuring and auditing the corporation’s CSR performance. The second
is the cost of deciding whether the corporation should improve its CSR
performance. The third is the cost of improving the corporation’s CSR
performance if the corporation decides to do that. Those costs may be
substantial. They will tend to increase the prices of the participating
corporations’ products and services.151
At the same time, participation will also tend to reduce some of the
participating corporations’ costs and thus reduce the prices of their
products and services.152 For example, reporting comprehensively
under a single set of standards may be less expensive than reporting
under the current system. Under the current system, more than a
hundred ESG “data providers” compete to obtain information from

150 See Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Activist Capitalism and Democracy 17,
33-35 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 568/2021, 2021) (noting that
CSR initiatives “[are] a means toward long-term returns (even though [they have]
short-term costs)”).
151 See, e.g., Desiree Hanford, Do Green Buildings Cost More?, FACILITIESNET (June 1,
2008),
https://www.facilitiesnet.com/green/article/Do-Green-Buildings-Cost-More-8954 [https://perma.cc/WJ62-RAGY] (discussing different costs of green buildings).
152 See Lipton, supra note 49, at 527 (“Corporations may generate goodwill from
customers, employees, and surrounding communities if they are perceived as good
citizens, which may translate into higher sales, better employee retention, and
productive relationships with regulators.”).

1478

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:1445

corporations and provide it to investors, raters, and rankers.153 “Many
provide lengthy questionnaires to companies (some with many
hundreds of questions). Responding to these forms takes a great deal of
time and effort . . . .”154
Corporations’ cost of evaluating and improving CSR performance
may be partly or entirely offset by ESG Benefit. High CSR-performing
corporations may have lower marketing costs because their CSR ratings
and rankings sell their products and services for them. Another way to
put the same point is that the published high ranking is free marketing
of the corporation’s products and services. High CSR-performing
corporations may achieve higher sales volumes and benefit from
economies of scale. High CSR-performing corporations’ greater appeal
to Potential Stakeholders may reduce their costs of hiring and retaining
employees,155 reduce their costs of finding and contracting with
strategic partners, increase their access to capital while reducing its
cost,156 and improve their relationships with the communities in which
they operate.
Because high-CSR-performing corporations will externalize fewer
social costs, they will tend to meet less resistance from regulators,
plaintiffs’ attorneys, labor organizations, and other hostiles. High-CSR
corporations’ brands will be more valuable.
CSR’s potential to reduce corporations’ costs is even more easily
visible from the perspective of society as a whole. “CSR” and
“sustainability” are often used interchangeably. Sustainability is the

153 See RAKHI KUMAR & ALI WEINER, STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISERS, THE ESG DATA
CHALLENGE 2 (2019), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-socialgovernance/2019/03/esg-data-challenge.pdf [https://perma.cc/263P-6TSU].
154 Bennington, supra note 63.
155 See Philipp Krueger, Daniel Metzger & Jiaxin Wu, The Sustainability Wage Gap
34-35 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 718/2020, 2021) (“[There is]
evidence that firms with better sustainability characteristics tend to pay lower wages
(about 10%) and attract and retain workers that are more skilled.”); see also George S.
Georgiev, The Human Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate Law, 95 TUL. L.
REV. 639, 663 (2021) (“In a resource-constrained environment, being able to attract and
retain human capital is an important part of a firm’s competitive strategy.”).
156 See Dan S. Dhaliwal, Oliver Zhen Li, Albert Tsang & Yong George Yang,
Voluntary Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting, 86 ACCT. REV. 59, 79-80 (2011) (finding that
the voluntary issuance of a sustainability report leads to a reduction in the firm’s cost
of capital and that firms with superior CSR performance attracts institutional investors
and analyst coverage); Bennington, supra note 63 (“Requiring disclosure of [ESG
information] directly by the Issuer will facilitate the flow of capital to US Issuers of all
sizes with or without ESG-related investment mandates.”).
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ability to exist continually.157 Corporations can achieve sustainability
only by internalizing their social costs.158 If all actors in the economy
do the same, the result is economic efficiency. If the human race exists
over the long run, economic efficiency — sustainability — is the
cheapest method of accomplishing that, not a source of additional
costs.159 If total social costs are lower and allocated appropriately, each
corporation’s costs will be lower.
CSR costs that corporations internalize will tend to be more than
offset by reduction of society’s costs of dealing with externalizations.
When corporations externalize their social costs, government often
responds by paying remediation costs and trying to recover them from
the wrongdoer, the wrongdoer’s industry, or the public.160 The
transaction costs of that process are high. Preventing externalization
eliminates the need for remediation and recovery. For example, if the
ESG information system prevents corporations from releasing the
greenhouse gases that cause rising sea levels, that may eliminate the
need for flood control measures in coastal cities or the relocation of
those cities to higher ground. If public expenses decreased,
governments could reduce taxes.
Lastly, total risk will be lower in a transparent economy because
economic actors will face less uncertainty. Risk is the lack of ability to
predict. Prediction is easier with more information. For all these
reasons, the ESG information system is more likely to reduce the cost
of goods and services than to increase them.

157 Sustainability — What Is It? Definition, Principles and Examples, YOUMATTER (June
18, 2021), https://youmatter.world/en/definition/definitions-sustainability-definitionexamples-principles/ [https://perma.cc/Y6HB-YR56].
158 See Geoffrey Heal, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic and Financial
Framework, 30 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 387, 393 (2005) (“The issues raised
provide us with an implicit definition of CSR, which we now formalize. CSR involves
taking actions which reduce the extent of externalized costs or avoid distributional
conflicts.”); Alessio M. Pacces, Sustainable Corporate Governance: The Role of the Law 13
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 550/2020, 2020) (“From an
economic standpoint, sustainability implies inter alia reducing the negative externalities
of production on the environment.”).
159 See Economic Efficiency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/
economic_efficiency.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/29BX-JNCW]
(“Economic efficiency is when all goods and factors of production in an economy are
distributed or allocated to their most valuable uses and waste is eliminated or
minimized.”).
160 E.g., Environmental Surcharge Definition, LAW INSIDER, https://www.lawinsider.
com/dictionary/environmental-surcharge (last visited Nov. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
33MP-627H].
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Once the ESG information system is effective, CSR’s benefits will
probably accrue disproportionately to the first corporations to report
and spend on CSR improvements. Stakeholders and the public will be
more likely to notice and react enthusiastically to their efforts. Those
corporations will tend to win high CSR rankings and then benefit from
the stickiness of ESG Benefit161 and the feedback loop in CSR
rankings.162 Even if the first-movers’ initial costs are higher, the
government may impose equally high costs on their competitors by
mandating the same CSR reporting and improvements. The laggards
will incur the costs without receiving the accolades.
Generally speaking, corporations will have to report and improve
before they will receive ESG Benefit. That means costs are likely to
increase before they decline. CSR should thus be thought of as an
investment. The ESG information system will provide investors with the
information they need to assess that investment.
2.

Cost Effects on Potential Stakeholder Power

Potential Stakeholders and the organizations that design and control
the ESG information system will share the power that system generates.
The organizations’ power will be derived from their ability to determine
what gets measured and by what standards. The Potential Stakeholders’
power will be derived from their freedom — to the extent of their
financial ability — to confer ESG benefit on whatever corporations they
chose on whatever bases they choose.163 Through their choices of what
corporations to deal or associate with, Potential Stakeholders can
reward corporations that express the Potential Stakeholders’ values.
Those dealings and associations — ESG Benefit — are the corporations’
incentives to repurpose themselves to the Potential Stakeholders’
values.
161

See infra Part II.A.2.
See Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity: How
Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1, 13-14 (2007) (characterizing
rankings as “self-fulfilling prophecies”); Luis L. Martins, A Model of the Effects of
Reputational Rankings on Organizational Change 16 ORG. SCI. 701, 712 (2005)
(“[B]usiness schools were more likely to undertake organizational change the more
their top managers perceived an identity-reputation discrepancy relative to the
rankings.”).
163 See Kishanthi Parella, Improving Human Rights Compliance in Supply Chains, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 749-50 (2019) (“These stakeholders rely on reputation when
deciding whether to provide a corporation with something it needs in order to succeed:
investors provide capital, employees provide talent, consumers provide revenue,
suppliers provide product sourcing and support, and communities provide the social
license to operate.” (footnotes omitted)).
162
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To exercise their power effectively, Potential Stakeholders must make
the effort necessary to inform themselves. With the right software, that
effort may be trivial. A consumer may choose between otherwise
virtually identical products on the basis of ESG information that appears
on the same computer screen, turn into the higher-ranked gas station
rather than the lower-ranked one, or click to see the relevant rankings
before buying a corporation’s shares at the market price. Eighty-five
percent of Americans and ninety-one percent of millennials say that
they would switch brands to one associated with a cause.164
A substantial literature reports that Potential Stakeholders are willing
to incur substantially higher costs to transact with high-CSR
performers. Consumers not only state a willingness to pay more for
socially responsible products,165 they actually buy more socially
responsible products166 and pay more for them.167 Corporations devote

164 CONE COMMC’NS, NEW CONE COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH CONFIRMS MILLENNIALS
AS AMERICA’S MOST ARDENT CSR SUPPORTERS, BUT MARKED DIFFERENCES REVEALED AMONG
THIS DIVERSE GENERATION 4 (2015), https://www.conecomm.com/2015-cone-

communications-millennial-csr-study-pdf [https://perma.cc/U83F-JB5J].
165 GLOBALWEBINDEX, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF
CSR
IN
TODAY’S
CONSCIOUS
CONSUMERIST
LANDSCAPE
4
(2019),
https://www.globalwebindex.com/reports/corporate-social-responsibility [https://perma.cc/
M4JW-GGCM] (“The number of consumers who would pay more for sustainable and
eco-friendly products has risen dramatically between 2011 and 2019, reaching almost
60%.”); see also CONE COMMC’NS, 2017 CONE COMMUNICATIONS CSR STUDY 9, 12 (2017),
https://www.conecomm.com/2017-cone-communications-csr-study-pdf [https://perma.cc/
4PCG-PRHA] (finding that eighty-seven percent of consumers would buy and seventysix percent would boycott based on values); Kendall Park, Understanding Ethical
Consumers: Willingness-to-Pay by Moral Cause, 35 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 157, 163 (2018)
(“With each additional year of education, respondents are willing to pay 10 cents more
[for products advertised as sustainably made]. Holding all other variables constant, a
college graduate would pay 39 cents more for the same pair of sustainable socks than a
high school graduate, and a medical doctor would pay 78 cents more.”).
166 Ryan W. Buell & Basak Kalkanci, How Transparency into Internal and External
Responsibility Initiatives Influences Consumer Choice, 67 MGMT. SCI. 932, 943 (2020)
(finding grocery store customers eighty-five percent more likely to purchase coffee
when exposed to information about the company’s internal sustainability practices, and
finding university bookstore customers nineteen percent more likely to purchase
certain products when informed about the company’s commitment to paying a living
wage); Jens Hainmueller, Michael J. Hiscox & Sandra Sequeira, Consumer Demand for
Fair Trade: Evidence from a Multistore Field Experiment, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 242, 253
(2015) (finding that grocery store sales of the two most popular bulk coffees rose by
ten percent in a field experiment when the coffees carried a Fair-Trade label).
167 See Hainmueller et al., supra note 166, at 251 (finding that customers who
regularly purchased more expensive coffee were “willing to pay a sizeable premium”
when the coffee was labeled as “Fair Trade”).
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substantial resources to vetting the corporations with whom they deal168
and deselecting corporations from their supply chains based on CSR
performance.169 Fifty-five percent of surveyed Americans and seventyfive percent of millennials say they would take a pay cut to work for a
responsible company.170 Forty-four percent of Americans “worry a great
deal” about climate change.171 Twenty-six percent of total US-domiciled
assets under management — $12 trillion — are invested using socially
responsible investment strategies,172 despite the lack of persuasive
evidence that such strategies produce higher returns.173 The most
sophisticated institutional investors are examining ESG risks for all the
corporations in which they invest.174 Although the available data may
168 Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L.
REV. 467, 496-502 (2020) (describing corporations’ writing and enforcement of rules
for other corporations with whom they deal).
169 CDP, CASCADING COMMITMENTS: DRIVING AMBITIOUS ACTION THROUGH SUPPLY
CHAIN ENGAGEMENT 6 (2019), https://www.cdp.net/en/research/global-reports/globalsupply-chain-report-2019 [https://perma.cc/KJ3K-QVNS] (noting that, in a survey of
115 major purchasing organizations belonging to the CDP Supply Chain Program (a
global sustainability disclosure organization), forty-three percent deselect suppliers
based on their environmental performance and an additional thirty percent are
considering doing so); see also Min Zhang, Lijun Ma, Jun Su & Wen Zhang, Do Suppliers
Applaud Corporate Social Performance?, 121 J. BUS. ETHICS 543, 553 (2014)
(“[E]nterprises which exhibit better CSR enjoy a closer relationship with the [supplier]
stakeholder groups and more trade credit from the groups.”).
170 CONE COMMC ’NS, MILLENNIAL E MPLOYEE E NGAGEMENT S TUDY 1 (2016),
https://www.conecomm.com/2016-cone-communications-millennial-employeeengagement-study-pdf [https://perma.cc/EAG6-HWE3]; accord David B. Montgomery
& Catherine A. Ramus, Calibrating MBA Job Preferences for the 21st Century, 10 ACAD.
MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 9, 17 (2011) (finding, in a study of MBA job hunters, “Ethical
Reputation rates as over 95% as important as Financial Package”).
171 Lydia Saad, Americans as Concerned as Ever About Global Warming, GALLUP
(Mar. 25, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/248027/americans-concerned-everglobal-warming.aspx [https://perma.cc/L3D5-SCQA].
172 U.S. SIF FOUND., REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING
TRENDS 1 (2018), https://www.ussif.org/files/2018%20_Trends_OnePager_Overview(2).pdf
[https://perma.cc/84TR-XNZD].
173 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 78, at 41 (“[H]igh scoring ESG portfolios,
even when using a best-in class approach that limits the concentration from reducing
exposure to lower ESG scores, do not seem to outperform traditional indices.”).
174 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 63, at 9 (“Institutional investors with
whom we spoke generally agreed that ESG issues can have a substantial effect on a company’s
long-term financial performance.”). For example, BlackRock now requires that each of its
portfolio managers take ESG information into account. See BlackRock’s 2020 Letter to Clients:
Sustainability
as
BlackRock’s
New
Standard
for
Investing,
BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/blackrock-client-letter [https://perma.cc/9HKT8SKM] (“By the end of 2020, all active portfolios and advisory strategies will be fully ESG
integrated — meaning that, at the portfolio level, our portfolio managers will be
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not be adequate to estimate the ESG Benefit that Potential Stakeholders
can confer, it appears to be substantial.
Once the ESG information system is complete and functioning,
Potential Stakeholders will be able to see the ESG information available
to them and assess the difficulty of incorporating it into their decision
making. Potential Stakeholders’ responses to that information will
initially determine the extent to which the corporation is repurposed.
II.

RESPONSES TO STANDARDIZATION

The standardization of CSR reporting will make repurposing possible.
The newly effective ESG information system will provide information
to corporations, Potential Stakeholders, and the public. The system’s
effect will depend on the recipients’ collective response to that
information. This part analyzes that response strategically.175 The
analysis is divided into two parts: (1) the corporations’ and Potential
Stakeholders’ strategic responses and their effects, and (2) the
magnification of those effects by ESG rankings and CSR prestige.
A. Strategic Response
The existence of the ESG information system will create a system of
incentives for corporations and Potential Stakeholders. The strength of
those incentives will increase as the system’s effectiveness increases.
This Section speculates on the strategies corporations and Potential
Stakeholders are likely to employ in response to the incentives. It
concludes that the interaction of those strategies will cause a substantial
majority of large corporations to report voluntarily to the dominant set
of standards. Some will report to the dominant standards as a whole,
while others will report to them only in part. Large majorities of
Potential Stakeholders will shift some or all of their associations to
confer ESG Benefit based on ESG information comparisons.
1.

Corporations

When a set of standards becomes dominant, corporations will face
two categories of choices. The first is the manner in which, and the
extent to which, they report. At present, corporations can report to
accountable for appropriately managing exposure to ESG risks and documenting how
those considerations have affected investment decisions.”).
175 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
479, 507-09 (1997) (explaining the relationship between strategic analysis and the
systems approach).
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some GRI or SASB standards without reporting to others.176 They can
also choose whether to respond to proprietary surveys and
questionnaires. But to be rated and ranked for CSR on data reported to
a dominant standard set will require that a corporation report to all or
substantially all of the raters’ or rankers’ criteria.177
Corporations’ incentives will be to report to all standards if that will
result in beneficial rating or ranking, to report to only particular
standards if that will result in beneficial ratings or ranking on those
particular criteria, or to report to no standards if the corporations would
not be beneficially rated or ranked on any.178 To enhance their own
ability to get information, raters and rankers encourage Potential
Stakeholders to assume the worst about non-reporters.179 A likely result
would be that only corporations that ranked above the average by
criteria would report to those criteria. Overall, a large majority of
corporations may choose to report to all or some standards, making a
system based on voluntary reporting viable.
The securities law requirement that public corporations “state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading” limits corporations’ ability to report selectively.180 A
corporation will either have to remain ignorant of facts that may be
crucial to the management of its business or collect those facts and risk
having to disclose them. Corporations will err on the side of overcollection and reporting because remaining ignorant would itself
endanger the corporations.181
The second category of corporate choice is the direction and
magnitude of the corporation’s effort to improve its CSR performance.

176

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 44, at 23 (providing criteria that must
be met to claim that a report was prepared “in accordance with the GRI standards”).
178 See Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Joseph A. McCahery & Paul C. Pudschedl, ESG
Performance and Disclosure: A Cross-Country Analysis 5 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 481/2019, 2019) (“[The study found] a strong relationship between
the extent of ESG disclosure and the quality of a firm’s disclosure.”).
179 See, e.g., Chocolate Company Scorecard, supra note 133 (“Non-participation [in
the survey] was viewed as a lack of transparency . . . .”); Companies Scores, CDP (2020),
https://www.cdp.net/en/companies/companies-scores [https://perma.cc/ZK7D-THCV]
(assigning letter grades to companies, with F signifying a “[f]ailure to provide enough
information to be evaluated”).
180 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021) (emphasis added).
181 See Remmer Sassen, Anne-Kathrin Hinze & Inga Hardeck, Impact of ESG Factors
on Firm Risk in Europe, 86 J. BUS. ECON. 867, 869 (2016) (providing evidence that “social
performance lowers firm risk”).
177
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“The literature suggests that firms generally respond to mandatory CSR
reporting by expanding and adjusting their CSR activities to improve
CSR performance, which is typically costly to firms.”182 Corporations
concerned only with profit maximization will seek to capture available
ESG Benefit because ESG Benefit is profit. That is, once corporations
have collected their ESG information, corporations will assess
investment in various aspects of CSR improvement on the same criteria
by which they assess competing deployments of their capital.
Corporations may improve their CSR performances by divesting
irresponsible operations. If the operations remain in the corporate
group, the divestment will be ineffective, because reporting is by group.
If the corporations spin the operations off or sell them, but continue to
receive products or services from the operations, the corporations may
be required to report on them as part of the corporations’ supply
chains.183
Even complete divestment may not result in a net improvement in the
environment if the buyer continues the operations. For example, BP
lowered its greenhouse gas emissions by sixteen percent by selling its
Alaskan operations to Hilcorp Energy Co. and others184 Because the
buyers continued the operations, a Bloomberg investigation later found
that “overall emissions from former BP facilities will likely be
unchanged or even rise under new owners.”185
If the ESG information system had been complete, it would have
moderated the effect of BP’s divestment in at least two ways. First, under
SASB standards, BP would have been encouraged to report the method
of its divestment. BP did so, and that may be how Bloomberg discovered
the problem.186 Second, potential customers would be reluctant to
182 Christensen et al., supra note 100, at 1231; accord Sorabh Tomar, Greenhouse Gas
Disclosure and Emissions Benchmarking (SMU Cox Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 1917, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3448904 [https://perma.cc/UC5P-N68M] (“In
2010, the United States mandated the reporting of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for
thousands of manufacturing facilities. . . . I find a 7.9% emissions reduction following
disclosure.”).
183 See supra Part I.B.3.a.
184 Rachel Adams-Heard, What Happens When an Oil Giant Walks Away, BLOOMBERG
GREEN (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-tracking-carbonemissions-BP-hilcorp/ [https://perma.cc/LQA4-GBH3].
185 Id.
186 See BP, SASB INDEX 2020, at 3 (2021), https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/
business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/sustainability/sasb-index-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6QSL-GGFT]; see also SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., OIL & GAS — EXPLORATION
& PRODUCTION 12-14 (2018), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Oil_
Gas_Exploration_Production_Standard_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQB9-9KKB]
(listing the discussion and analysis of “long-term and short-term strategy or plan to
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purchase from Hilcorp, because purchasing would add a non-reporting
company to their supply chain.187 Once the other major oil companies
were similarly divested, their incentives would be to support a
regulatory crackdown on their non-reporting competitors.
2.

Potential Stakeholders

Potential Stakeholders’ most basic strategy will be to associate with
highly rated and ranked corporations. In doing so, they may be seeking
the financial advantage of beneficial CSR associations or merely
expressing and promoting their values.
Some Potential Stakeholders will be more interested in the
corporation’s performance on specific issues than in its overall CSR
performance. Potential employees may be most concerned with the
corporation’s treatment of employees, communities with its treatment
of other communities, customers with its treatment of customers, or any
of them with the corporation’s record on human rights, carbon
emissions, or the race and gender of directors, officers, or employees.188
The effect will be to make ESG Benefit available to corporations that
perform well on a few CSR criteria even if they don’t perform well
overall. Thus, a large majority of public corporations may benefit from
reporting to the dominant standards on at least some issues. Their
selective reporting will contribute to the standards’ credibility.
Potential Stakeholders can change some associations quickly and
easily. Investors can trade in or out of a corporation’s shares in minutes.
Customers who buy consumable products can easily switch to similar
products from other corporations. Other associations, such as
employment or the corporation’s location of operations in a community,
will require more time and effort to change. This stickiness will slow
the market’s reaction to changes in ESG information and cause that
reaction to be incomplete.

manage Scope 1 emissions” as an accounting metric for greenhouse gas emission
disclosures).
187 See Adams-Heard, supra note 184 (“[N]one of the three buyers on the other side
of BP’s recent divestment deals discloses overall carbon data or has meaningful climate
plans.”).
188 See Paul Sullivan, How Investors Are Addressing Racial Injustice, N.Y. T IMES
(July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/your-money/investors-racialinjustice.html [https://perma.cc/FD6K-BR59] (describing socially responsible investing
intended to promote gender and racial diversity).
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Consumer expenditures constitute approximately sixty-eight percent
of gross domestic product,189 making consumers potentially the most
important distributors of ESG Benefit. Repurposing may depend on
consumers’ levels of enthusiasm for and participation in the process of
directing ESG Benefit. Those levels will depend largely on the
availability of software to support consumer decision making and the
promotion of repurposing by the media.
3.

Interaction

A corporation that takes CSR action to gain ESG Benefit will likely
face two consecutive delays. The first is the delay between the action
and its reflection in ratings and rankings. The second is the delay
between its reflection in ratings and rankings and the corporation’s
receipt of ESG Benefit. For a given company, each delay may be years.
The delays will have two systemic effects. First, CSR is an investment.
Corporations will have to invest years before they receive the benefits.
Second, corporations must act early on the basis of their guesses about
the future. Corporations that hold off in their own investment to see
how others fare could fall years behind in a period of rapid change. That
may in part explain why some corporations are already reporting to
dominant standards when little comparison is possible and little ESG
Benefit available. When comparison becomes possible, those
corporations will already have the knowledge and experience needed to
compete.
The result could be a stampede to report to the dominant standards
even before the ESG information system is fully in place. Once
corporations have collected and reported the information, they will use
it to make CSR improvements that will produce ESG Benefit.
Some corporations will choose to compete on the traditional bases of
price and quality and externalize as much of their social costs as is
permitted by law. As Part IV explains, those corporations will be
battling on multiple fronts. Mutual funds and activist shareholders will
be pressing them to measure and report ESG information and
threatening to fire directors who don’t go along. The corporations’
public images and reputations will be tarnished by their failure to
adhere to “stewardship codes,” ethics rules, and business norms. Their
189 U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Shares of Gross Domestic Product: Personal
Consumption Expenditures, FED. RSRV. ECON. DATA (July 29, 2021),
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DPCERE1Q156NBEA [https://perma.cc/9VU8-N6RU]
(showing graphically that personal consumption expenditures were approximately
sixty-eight percent of gross domestic product in the third quarter of 2020).
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continued externalization of social costs will not only appear, but will
actually be, irresponsible.
Even price-and-quality corporations who persevere ultimately have
no future. If the number and sizes of the nonreporting corporations
remain large enough to affect the markets for products and services, the
reporting corporations and their stakeholders will demand that
government level the playing field by mandating reporting and
improvement.190
4.

Cheating

Some corporations will try to obtain ESG Benefit by exploiting
ambiguities in the standards or reporting false data.191 This problem is
not materially different from the analogous problem with the financial
reporting system. The solutions are, in part, the same as the solutions
to cheating in the financial reporting system: third party auditing,
whistleblower protections, government regulations, government
enforcement, and securities and consumer class actions. The use of
these techniques in combination may be more effective than the use of
each alone.192
A financial audit is an examination and evaluation of the financial
statements of a corporation to determine whether it “present[s] fairly in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” the
corporation’s financial performance or position.193 The financial
190 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in
Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy: A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 BUS.
LAW. 397, 399, 432 (2021) (“[T]he debate is not narrowly focused on just public
companies, but demanding more accountability from all societally influential private
companies whose actions have contributed to these problems.”).
191 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFF. OF THE INVESTOR ADVOC., REPORT ON ACTIVITIES 9
(2020), https://www.sec.gov/advocate/reportspubs/annual-reports/sec-investor-advocatereport-on-activities-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/V864-GXB6] (“Greenwashing is likely to
grow increasingly problematic as companies and funds viewed as ESG-friendly continue
to attract assets at an accelerating pace.”).
192 Cf. Fernán Restrepo, Hedge Fund Regulation, Performance, and Risk-Taking: ReExamining the Effect of the Dodd-Frank Act 39 (Mar. 16, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3541916 [https://perma.cc/L29WJBHA] (concluding empirical results “suggest that mandatory disclosure, enforcement
intensity, and auditors perform a complementary role” in the setting of financial
reporting).
193 N.E. Kirk, ‘True and Fair View’ Versus ‘Present Fairly in Conformity with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles’ 1 (Aug. 6, 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/fms/Colleges/College%20of%20Business/School%20
of%20Accountancy/Documents/Discussion%20Papers/208.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2YQFJCM].
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statements of public corporations must be audited annually by Certified
Public Accountants (“CPAs”). CPAs are licensed professionals paid by
the audited corporations. The purpose of an audit is to provide “an
independent opinion about whether the financial statements are
presented fairly in all material respects.”194 Audits are conducted in
accord with standards that “require that the auditor plan and perform
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement, whether due to error or
fraud.”195
Although the word “audit” is used principally with respect to
financial audit in the United States, CPA and other types of firms also
audit nonfinancial — including ESG — information and provide
“reasonable” or “limited” assurance for the benefit of third parties. At
the higher, “reasonable,” level of assurance, the auditor would use “a
combination of inspection, observation, confirmation, re-calculation,
re-performance, analytical procedures and inquiry . . . including, where
applicable, obtaining corroborating information, and depending on the
nature of the subject matter, tests of the operating effectiveness of
controls.”196 That is, they inspect and test the corporation’s ESG
information collection system to make sure it is reporting accurate data
and then put their own reputations on the line by providing assurances
to third parties.
Studies differ sharply on the current extent of third-party assurance
of reported ESG data.197 By compiling a random sample of CSR reports
194 PUB. CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., THE AUDITOR’S REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS WHEN THE AUDITOR EXPRESSES AN UNQUALIFIED OPINION 2 n.2 (2017),
https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket034/2017-001-auditors-report-final-rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8X5-FV82].
195 Id. at app. 1, A1-5.
196 INT’L AUDITING & ASSURANCE BD., INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURANCE
ENGAGEMENTS 21-22 (2008), https://www.ifac.org/system/files/downloads/International
_Framework_for_Assurance_Engagements.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8RX-8UXN].
197 Compare, e.g., JOSÉ LUIS BLASCO & ADRIAN KING, KPMG, THE ROAD AHEAD: THE KPMG
SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 26 (2017), https://home.kpmg/xx/en/
home/insights/2017/10/the-kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.html
[https://perma.cc/KA3V-PCKY] (“Assurance of CR data is now accepted standard
practice among G250 companies with more than two thirds (67 percent) of these
companies seeking assurance.”), with, e.g., SOL KWON, INVESTOR RESP. RSCH. CTR. INST.,
STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY AND INTEGRATED REPORTING 2018, at 29 (2018),
https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2018/11/2018-SP-500Integrated-Reporting-FINAL-November-2018-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PGH-YTC5]
(“A minority (about 38 percent) of reports obtain external assurance, and 90 percent of
these pertain only to some data, in most cases GHG emissions. . . . Only 3 percent of
reporters assert their reports or ES performance data are completely externally
verified.”).
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by one hundred S&P 500 companies, I found that ninety-three
published CSR reports for 2020.198 Forty-six of the ninety-three (47%)
obtained assurances. Thirty-three of the ninety-three (35%) reported
limited assurances, six (6%) reported reasonable assurances, five (5%)
reported moderate assurances, two (2%) reported high assurances, and
the remaining forty-seven (51%) did not report assurances.199 What is
most important at this stage of the ESG information system’s
development is that CPA firms and others stand ready to provide
reasonable assurance regarding ESG information. They do.200
As discussed in Part I.A.1, public corporations’ liability for the
publication of false ESG information is limited by the puffing, total-mixof-information, and materiality doctrines. But public corporations that
publish materially false ESG information that does affect the total mix
can be held liable in securities class actions.201 False ESG information
may also create liability under federal and state consumer protection
and anti-fraud statutes and regulations.202 As ESG information is
standardized and becomes more credible these actions will become
easier to win because materiality and reliance will be more common.203
Lastly, the structure of the ESG information system will itself deter
cheating. The evaluators are independent market actors who are free to
impose any penalties they consider appropriate for cheating. For
example, U.S. News has punitively lowered the rankings of law schools
that have given them incorrect information.204 The ESG information
198 Lynn M. LoPucki, Assurances Study 2 (2021) (unpublished data) (on file with
the author).
199 Id.
200 See, e.g., ALLSTATE, supra note 23, at 26 (“Our information security practices are
subject to both internal and external audits . . . .”). SMETA Audit is a widely used ethical
audit format for the areas of labor, health and safety, environment, and business ethics.
SMETA Audit, SEDEX, https://www.sedex.com/smeta-audit/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/Q5BU-2CBA].
201 E.g., In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 12-cv-1256, 2013 WL 6383968, at *27 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 5, 2013) (holding statements in BP’s “Sustainability Reviews” actionable); In
re Massey Energy Co. Sec. Litig., 833 F. Supp. 2d 597, 626 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (holding
that the investors “sufficiently alleged particular facts supporting an allegation that its
losses were caused by [Defendant]’s misleading and false statements about the safety of
its mines”).
202 E.g., Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-84 (2021).
203 Amanda M. Rose, A Response to Calls for SEC-Mandated ESG Disclosure, 98 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1821, 1849-50 (2021) (“[E]vent-driven securities litigation [has] increased
in prevalence in recent years, and SEC-mandated ESG disclosure would only accelerate
this trend.”).
204 E.g., Scott Jaschik, Oklahoma Gave False Data for Years to ‘U.S. News,’ Loses
Ranking, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 28, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/
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system’s purpose is to assess and communicate CSR. Cheating on ESG
information is not only the antithesis of CSR, it is a threat to the power
of Potential Stakeholders to repurpose the corporation. Potential
Stakeholders will likely support evaluators who discover cheating and
impose draconian penalties.205
B. Response Magnification
Two aspects of the ESG information system will magnify the effects
on corporations of even small differences in their levels of CSR. First,
by making rankings credible, high-quality ESG information will enable
CSR ranking and ignite CSR competition. Second, CSR’s pre-existing
association with wealth and social status will increase the payoffs for
corporations and Potential Stakeholders who make high-CSR
associations.
1.

Ranking’s Effects

Hundreds of organizations already rank corporations for CSR or some
aspect of it. Those rankings have limited effect because they lack
credibility.206 Completion of the ESG information system will, however,
enable the ranking systems that survive to become credible.
Credible ranking systems can induce competition among ranked
organizations207 and cause their behavior to conform to the ranking
criteria.208 The process of ranking organizations involves three parties:
the organizations ranked, the organizations ranking them, and the
audience that uses the ranking. When rankings are credible, the rankers
and the audience gain power over the ranked organizations.209 In the
context of university rankings, it has been shown that reactions to
admissions/article/2019/05/28/university-oklahoma-stripped-us-news-ranking-supplyingfalse [https://perma.cc/A5AE-BMX6].
205 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
206 See supra Part I.A.2.
207 Jelena Brankovic, Leopold Ringel & Tobias Werron, How Rankings Produce
Competition: The Case of Global University Rankings, 47 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIOLOGIE 270,
270 (2018) (Ger.) (“[R]ankings are almost routinely recognized as an important driver
of [increasing competition].”).
208 Martins, supra note 162, at 702 (“[T]here appears to be a consensus in the
literature that rankings are sources of normative pressure on organizations that push
them to conform to the criteria used by the rankings.”).
209 Alice M.M. Miller & Simon R. Bush, Authority Without Credibility? Competition
and Conflict Between Ecolabels in Tuna Fisheries, 107 J. CLEANER PROD. 137, 137 (2015)
(“[O]nce a label is deemed credible by those-to-be-governed, the standards and
institutions used to verify compliance to them can exercise power through exclusion.”).
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rankings redistribute resources, redefine organizational purpose, and
induce responsive strategies.210
The power that U.S. News and World Report gained over law schools
by ranking them demonstrates the ability of rankings to transform the
nature of ranked institutions. Sociologists studying law school rankings
have found that they “changed the fundamental activities of schools,
transforming, for instance, how actors make decisions, do their jobs,
and think about their schools.”211 Sauder and Espeland found that
“rankings have become naturalized and internalized as a standard of
comparison and success. In changing how law schools think about
themselves and pressuring schools toward self-discipline, rankings are
now deeply embedded within schools, directing attention, resources,
and interventions.”212
Continual ranking magnifies small differences among the ranked
organizations in two ways. First, ranking emphasizes the order of the
ranked subjects and deemphasizes the amounts of the differences
among them. Aside from rankers’ limited use of “ties,” only one ranked
organization can be first — even if many are excellent. The amounts of
the differences are usually reported ineffectively or not at all. As
Brankovic, et al., put it, “by producing, visualizing and publicizing often
minimal differences in performance, rankings ‘scarcify’ reputation.”213
Espeland and Sauder also note this capacity to magnify small
differences.214
Second, ranking procedures usually contain a feedback loop. That is,
this year’s rankings are in part based on the ranked organization’s
perceived reputation among the audience. That perceived reputation is
in part determined by the prior year’s rankings.215 The feedback loop
not only magnifies differences over time, but also makes initially low
rankings difficult for organizations to escape. Anticipation of these
effects forces organizations to respond earlier and more decisively to the
invitation to compete for rankings.216

210

Espeland & Sauder, supra note 162, at 3.
Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, The Discipline of Rankings: Tight
Coupling and Organizational Change, 74 AM. SOCIO. REV. 63, 64 (2009).
212 Id. at 79.
213 Brankovic et al., supra note 207, at 282.
214 Espeland & Sauder, supra note 162, at 12 (“Although the raw scores used to
construct USN rankings are tightly bunched, listing schools by rank magnifies these
statistically insignificant differences in ways that produce real consequences for schools,
since their position affects the perceptions and actions of outside audiences.”).
215 Id. at 13-14 (characterizing rankings as “self-fulfilling prophecies”).
216 See Martins, supra note 162.
211
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CSR ranking is likely to have an even greater impact on corporations
than U.S. News ranking has had on law schools, because corporation
managers have less reason to resist CSR rankings than law school deans
had to resist law school rankings. First, while U.S. News largely dictated
its standards, GRI and SASB sought consensuses among investors and
corporate leaders. Second, corporate leaders have good reason to prefer
CSR to shareholder wealth maximization as their primary objective:
service to CSR will place them in higher social esteem. The point was
captured perfectly in a New Yorker cartoon in which a director tells the
other board members “I too hate being a greedy bastard, but we have a
responsibility to our shareholders.”217 By contrast, law school deans do
not regard U.S. News rankings as benefitting either themselves or their
schools.218
2.

The Prestige Hierarchy’s Effects

CSR is prestigious.219 Like rankings, CSR’s prestige will amplify the
effects of ESG information. CSR is prestigious because it reflects widely
217 LOPUCKI AND VERSTEIN, supra note 47, at 585 (reproducing the cartoon by Mick
Stevens in the New Yorker magazine’s March 5, 2001, issue).
218 E.g., Louis H. Pollak, Why Trying to Rank Law Schools Numerically Is a NonProductive Undertaking: An Article on the U.S. News & World Report 2009 List of “The
Top 100 Schools”, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 52, 52 (2009) (“I am convinced that [the U.S. News
& World Report] is an incubus, bad for the health of legal education.”); Alex Wellen,
The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/
2005/07/31/us/education/the-878-million-maneuver.html [https://perma.cc/3B8D-6B9J]
(quoting then-Stanford Law School Dean Larry Kramer, “These rankings are corrosive
to the actual education mean because this poll takes the following 12 criteria and now
you have to fetishize them”); Interview with Kevin Johnson, Dean of the University of
California Davis, School of Law, TOP L. SCHS. (Sept. 2009), https://www.top-lawschools.com/kevin-johnson-interview.html [https://perma.cc/S23U-N63T] (“Virtually
every law school dean loves to hate the U.S. News & World Report law school rankings.
I can assure you that law school deans across the country dread the rankings released
every April.”).
219 Tara S. Behrend, Becca A. Baker & Lori Foster Thompson, Effects of ProEnvironmental Recruiting Messages: The Role of Organizational Reputation, 24 J. BUS.
PSYCH. 341, 347 (2009) (“The analysis demonstrates that an environmental message on
a company’s web site has the effect of improving the perceived reputation of the
company, and in turn the enhanced reputation of a company makes it more attractive
to prospective employees. . . . [I]ndividuals may believe that if an organization can
spend money on the environment then it is . . . prestigious . . . .”); David A. Jones,
Chelsea R. Willness & Kristin W. Heller, Illuminating the Signals Job Seekers Receive from
an Employer’s Community Involvement and Environmental Sustainability Practices: Insights
into Why Most Job Seekers Are Attracted, Others Are Indifferent, and a Few Are Repelled, 7
FRONTIER PSYCH. 1, 3 (2016) (“When an employer is known for its CSR practices . . . it
signals to job seekers that the organization is prestigious and well-regarded by others.”
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shared, pro-social values: preservation of the planet and environment;
fair treatment of customers, employees, and suppliers; contribution to
the community; charity; and respect for human rights. Even corporate
CEOs220 and scholars who advocate shareholder wealth
maximization221 rush to associate themselves with CSR values. Most
people prefer being the “good guys” to being the “bad guys.”
The result is a prestige hierarchy of corporations, with the most
socially responsible corporations at the top and the least socially
responsible at the bottom. This prestige hierarchy coincides with the
prestige hierarchies based on corporate financial success and size. That
is, even without a credible ESG information system, high-CSR ranking
already correlates with high-reputational ranking.222

(citation omitted)); Christopher J. Waples & Benjamin J. Brachle, Recruiting Millennials:
Exploring the Impact of CSR Involvement and Pay Signaling on Organizational
Attractiveness, 27 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T MGMT. 870, 876 (2020) (“[O]rganizational
attractiveness encompasses three . . . facets: general attraction, intent to pursue
employment, and perceived prestige. All three were found to increase when CSR
information was emphasized.”).
220 E.g., BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PURPOSE STATEMENT, supra note 9 (corporate CEOs
endorsing CSR).
221 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV 91, 168 (2020) (“[Corporations’] profitseeking operations contribute to a wide array of society’s problems and impose serious
negative externalities on employees, communities, consumers, and the environment.”);
Rock, supra note 40, at 394-95 (“Finally, we should never forget that many of our
problems require regulatory solutions and that we should not fool ourselves into
thinking that tinkering with corporate objective can begin to substitute for regulation
to control climate change, assure decent wages and working hours, and decent health
care, as well as social insurance against the various downsides from competitive global
markets.”); see also, e.g., Parella, supra note 163, at 735 (noting that in the human rights
context “[a] disgraced corporation . . . associates itself with one or more reputable
organizations” to restore its legitimacy by adopting the reputable organization’s rules).
222 Chi-Shiun Lai, Chih-Jen Chiu, Chin-Fang Yang & Da-Chang Pai, The Effects of
Corporate Social Responsibility on Brand Performance: The Mediating Effect of Industrial
Brand Equity and Corporate Reputation, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 456, 465 (2010) (“CSR and
corporate reputation have positive effects on industrial brand equity and brand
performance.”); Clara Pe rez-Cornejo, Ester de Quevedo-Puente & Juan Bautista
Delgado-García, Reporting as a Booster of the Corporate Social Performance Effect on
Corporate Reputation, 27 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T MGMT. 1252, 1258 (2020) (finding,
“based on an international sample of firms for six years,” that corporate social
performance “positively affect[s] corporate reputation”); Zia ur Rehman, Asad Khan &
Asim Rahman, Corporate Social Responsibility’s Influence on Firm Risk and Firm
Performance: The Mediating Role of Firm Reputation, 27 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T. MGMT.
2991, 2997 (2020) (finding that better CSR performance may lead to a firm’s induction
into Fortune’s reputation list).
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Figure 2. The CSR Prestige Hierarchy

A similar prestige hierarchy exists among Potential Stakeholders. The
most highly qualified job candidates tend to be wealthier, better
educated, and value CSR more highly.223 As the candidates seek to
identify the largest, wealthiest, and most socially responsible
corporations, size, wealth, and social responsibility reinforce one
another.224
The mutual desire of corporations and Potential Stakeholders to
associate with CSR, combined with the hierarchical organization of both
groups, produces a pattern of transactions like that shown by the nearly
horizontal arrows in Figure 2. Wealthy, high-status, CSR-valuing
stakeholders are more likely to transact with large, high-status, highCSR-reporting corporations, leaving the poorer, low-status stakeholders
who devalue CSR to transact with the low-status, smaller organizations
that tend not to CSR report.
The correlation of CSR with those other measures of status enhances
CSR’s prestige and promotes CSR. To move up in that system, Potential
Stakeholders must associate with more responsible corporations and
one way to do that is to be more responsible.
223 See Park, supra note 165, at 161-64 (demonstrating education’s association with
CSR); Daniel Hedblom, Brent R. Hickman & John A. List, Toward an Understanding of
Corporate Social Responsibility: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence 41 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26222, 2019) (“[Recruiting workers by advertising
CSR] works to improve productivity, quality-adjusted supply of output to the firm, and
per-unit production costs.”); Krueger et al., supra note 155, at 2 (“[M]ost individuals
do care about the sustainability characteristics of their jobs and these preferences are
generally more pronounced for highly educated workers and for more recent cohorts.”).
224 See Behrend et al., supra note 219, at 347 (“One possible explanation for this
relationship [between reputation and the effect of a pro-environmental response] is that
job-seekers associate pro-environmental activities with successful and lucrative
companies.”).
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As an example of how CSR is correlated with other measures of status,
assume that green buildings cost more to build and, as a result, cost
more to rent. ESG-reporting corporations will place a relatively high
value on owning such buildings because ownership may contribute to
their ESG ratings and rankings. Because those corporations are larger
and wealthier, they can better afford the buildings. Tenants who value
CSR will prefer to rent in those buildings because it will improve their
ESG ratings and rankings and associate them with the high-status
landlord. Those tenants can afford the green buildings because they are
wealthier and more successful.
The prestige derived from associating with more responsible Potential
Stakeholders is also an end in itself. That is, CSR prestige is an ESG
Benefit available to high-CSR performers.
III. CORPORATE AND INFORMATION SYSTEM CONTROL
This Part explains how the repurposed corporation will be governed
and the ESG information system regulated. Potential Stakeholders will
control the corporation by conferring ESG Benefit. Even if they do not
gain sufficient leverage from the ESG information system to repurpose
the corporation, the government or parallel processes will complete the
repurposing. Once CSR is measured, CSR will be managed.
A. Corporate Control
One of the few mandatory rules of corporate law is that shareholders
must have the right to elect the directors.225 When a single shareholder
or group owns a majority of the voting power, that shareholder or group
is said to “control” the corporation. It can, as a practical matter, cause
the corporation to pursue any objective it chooses.226 That objective
may or may not be the maximization of shareholder wealth.
By the majority-of-the-voting-power test, however, only about seven
percent of U.S. public corporations are “controlled” by shareholders.227
225 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b) (2021) (“[I]mmediately following any such
redemption the corporation shall outstanding 1 or more shares . . . which . . . shall have
full voting powers.”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.03(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(“[O]ne or more shares that together have unlimited voting rights . . . must be
outstanding.”).
226 Rock, supra note , at 394 (“So long as shareholders retain the sole voting rights,
corporations will largely be managed for the benefit of the shareholders, whatever the
interpretation of the weaker bonds of fiduciary obligation.”).
227 EDWARD KAMONJOH, INVESTOR RESP. RSCH. CTR. INST., CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN
THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE & RISK 15 (2016),
https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2016/03/Controlled-Companies-
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When the voting power is dispersed, directors and executives gain
varying measures of control and influence.228 Repurposing will not
change that voting control structure or the dynamics of that control.
Corporations are also controlled through markets. The function of a
corporation is to organize some aspect of the production and
distribution of goods and services. What the corporation does is to bring
stakeholders together in a sustainable web of contractual and
noncontractual relationships. Figure 3 diagrams those relationships.
Figure 3. The Corporation as a System

Each of the stakeholder relationships shown on the figure is formed
in the context of a market. In those markets, Potential Stakeholders’
preferences limit, and thus control, the directors’ actions. In repurposed
corporations, this market control will be primary. In responding to
shareholder voting control, the directors will be able to act only within
narrow limits set by the stakeholder markets.
Although the ESG information system will benefit the reporting
corporations, their stakeholders and Potential Stakeholders will be the
primary beneficiaries. They will have more market power because their
choices can better express their preferences. The corporation will learn
more about itself by collecting ESG information about itself. Some
stakeholders, including suppliers, customers, shareholders, and
creditors, will themselves be CSR reporters and so will reveal new
information about themselves, to the benefit of the corporation. But
ESG information about the relatively small proportion of Potential
IRRCI-2015-FINAL-3-16-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WD9-WGAE]; accord Barbara Novick,
“The Goldilocks Dilemma”: A Response to Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, 120 COLUM. L.
REV. F. 80, 82 (2020) (noting that, for the majority of public companies, “the largest
shareholder holds only a single digit percentage of shares outstanding”).
228 LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note 47, at 315 (explaining the shifting control
among shareholders, directors, and officers).
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Stakeholders who are business corporations will not be nearly as useful
to the corporation as ESG information about the corporation will be to
numerous Potential Stakeholders.
Like the unrepurposed corporation, the repurposed corporation may
or may not seek to maximize shareholder wealth. Whether it does will
depend on the preferences of the persons in control of the corporation
as control is conventionally defined. They may be officers, directors, or
shareholders.229
The incentives to benefit stakeholders and the public through CSR
performance will be the same for shareholder-wealth-maximizing and
non-shareholder-wealth-maximizing corporations. Both have the same
opportunity to win ESG Benefit by appearing at the top of the CSR
rankings. As is true today, potential stakeholders will not know whether
a corporation is shareholder-wealth-maximizing.
The corporation will receive its ESG Benefit in the stakeholder
markets. Potential Stakeholders will choose to associate with, and
thereby benefit, the repurposed corporation, because the corporation’s
ratings and rankings indicate that the corporation: (1) treats
stakeholders of the Potential Stakeholder’s type fairly or generously, or
(2) shares the stakeholder’s values with respect to the corporation’s
treatment of other stakeholders and the public. That is, Potential
Stakeholder decision making will be both selfish and altruistic.
Stakeholder markets will constantly pressure the corporation to
benefit stakeholders and the public in ways that Potential Stakeholders
approve. Those markets will remain far from perfect. The ESG
information system cannot report every policy-relevant variable, and
shoppers on Amazon are not capable of evaluating a seller’s greenhouse
gas emissions. But an effective ESG information system can report more
variables than can actually achieve salience in Potential Stakeholder
decision making,230 and shoppers can be shown a credible third party’s
rating or ranking of the seller’s climate change performance. So long as
the stakeholder markets press corporations in the right directions, the
corporations will move in the right directions.
Environmental and social activists will continue to use boycotts,
protests, labor organizing, engagement, and information campaigns to
redirect corporate efforts. The ESG information system will facilitate the

229

Id.
See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003) (“[N]on-drafting parties
(usually buyers) are boundedly rational decisionmakers who will normally price only a
limited number of product attributes as part of their purchase decision.”).
230
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tasks of discovering the need for redirection and persuading the
activists’ followers of that need.
B. ESG Information System Control
This Section considers who will control the ESG information system.
That system consists of essentially four subsystems. They are the
systems for: (1) promulgating reporting standards, (2) collecting and
auditing corporate-level ESG data, (3) processing corporate-level ESG
data into ratings and rankings, and (4) delivering ratings and rankings
at the points of decision-making.
Promulgating reporting standards. The organizations that promulgated
the dominant standards initially will have the ability to modify them.231
For example, if SASB’s standards dominate, SASB’s board of directors will
be able to modify them. But the federal government would be the ultimate
standards controller, because it has the power to substitute any standards
it chooses.232 As a Congressional Research Service report put it:
One option is to let the markets determine what should be
disclosed within the existing regulatory structure. If in the long
run there is sufficient interest by investors, and SASB standards
become widely accepted, then Congress could direct the SEC to
require corporate disclosures in compliance with standards
promulgated by SASB and standardize the reporting structure.
. . . Another option is to require the SEC to undertake a costbenefit study and assess investor interest in sustainability
disclosures in order to formalize and standardize sustainability
disclosure as part of SEC filings.233
If SASB standards become dominant, SASB will probably act much as
the government would if the government had control, perhaps making
it unnecessary for the government to actually take control.
A requirement that corporations report ESG information is the most
likely government intervention. Cynthia Williams and Jill Fisch

231 See Fisch, supra note 61, at 951 (“[S]ustainability is a moving target, meaning
that the issues that arguably warrant disclosure and their importance continue to
evolve.”).
232 See Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Data Standardization, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
737, 767 (2019) (listing the government’s options, including “supervised delegation to
an industry-based [standards setting organization], comprised of professional data
scientists”).
233 GNANARAJAH, supra note , at 31-32.
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petitioned the SEC for that intervention,234 and the SEC Asset
Management Advisory Committee has tentatively recommended it.235
Collecting and auditing data. The corporations themselves will control
the systems that collect data at the corporate level. The reasons are that
data collection is expensive, requires the involvement of corporate
employees, and must occur at locations controlled by the
corporations.236 The government will likely regulate only the auditing
function and do so in a manner similar to its regulation of financial
information auditing.
Rating and ranking. Government ratings or rankings of CSR are highly
unlikely. The ESG information system’s purpose, construed most
narrowly, is to provide investors — nearly half of all Americans — with
the information they need to allocate ESG Benefit. Consequently, ESG
information must be public. Once it is public, the First Amendment
would prevent the government from banning its use in ratings and
rankings. Thus, government ratings or rankings would have to compete
with private sector rankings. The government would be reluctant to
enter a credibility competition it might lose, and there is no foreseeable
harm from the possibility the government might enter and win.
Delivering ratings and rankings. Delivering ratings and rankings to
product and service purchasers at the point of decision making may
present greater challenges. At the point of decision making, about
thirty-five percent of ecommerce purchasers are looking at a screen
controlled by Amazon.237 In response to competitive pressures and
consumer demand, that screen might show third-party ESG ratings and
rankings. Alternatively, (1) Amazon might try to leverage its market
power to impose a rating and ranking system that Amazon controls,238
234 Letter from Cynthia A. Williams, Bus. L. Chair, Osgood Hall L. Sch. & Jill E.
Fisch, Professor of Bus. L., Univ. Pa. L. Sch., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Request for Rulemaking on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)
Disclosure (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88PC-FEM5]; see also Fisch, supra note 61, at 956-59 (proposing that
each public corporation include a “sustainability discussion and analysis” in its annual
report).
235 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 35, at 7.
236 For example, measuring greenhouse gas emissions from a waste dump will
require access to the waste dump. GHG PROTOCOL, supra note 73, at 21 (“[I]t can be
difficult and time consuming to collect GHG emissions data from joint operations not
under the control of the reporting company.”).
237 What’s Amazon’s Market Share?, BENEDICT EVANS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.benevans.com/benedictevans/2019/12/amazons-market-share19 [https://perma.cc/QG2L-94TF]
(“Amazon has a large (35-40%) share of ecommerce . . . .”).
238 Amazon already sells an Alexa skill called “fair shopping.” Fair Shopping,
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07JL9LM7T?tag=skill-enabled-20 (last visited
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or (2) Amazon’s customers might obtain product-matched ESG
information through another application or device while shopping on
Amazon.
C. Market Verses Democratic Control
An effective ESG information system will shift corporate control from
the narrow group of controlling shareholders, directors and managers
to millions of Potential Stakeholders. Thus it would, in its overall effect,
be democratic.
Because the Potential Stakeholders would be acting through markets,
their preferences would be weighted by the dollar amounts of their
transactions — what Masconale and Sepe have colorfully dubbed “a
(moral) tyranny of the (capitalist) majority.”239 The wealthy would
count more than the poor. That is not, however, a change in policy. The
stakeholder markets are already operating, and preferences are already
measured in dollars. The reform would merely provide Potential
Stakeholders with the information they need to express their
preferences effectively.
Nor is the political system more democratic. The wealthy — including
corporations — spend large amounts of money to enhance their influence
in the political system. Despite CSR’s overwhelming popularity, the
political system has been unable to require it. Stakeholder markets may
be able to do what the political system could not.
SASB’s standards are designed to provide the information investors
need.240 If SASB’s standards prevail, other stakeholders will receive the
same ESG information. That information will not, however, be designed
to meet the other stakeholders’ needs or be in forms convenient for their
use. Among other deficiencies, the information will not link products
and services to the CSR of their manufacturers and sellers.241

Nov. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8FG9-VAZY]. “Fair shopping aggregates thousands of
products in categories such as fashion, home decor, body care, and jewelry. Products
are considered ‘fair’ because they are produced with organic, fair trade materials, labor
is ethical, and or the products are sustainably sourced.” Id.
239 Masconale & Sepe, supra note 150, at 7.
240 SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE SASB
CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
AND
RULES
OF
PROCEDURE
25
(2020),
https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Invitation-to-Comment-SASB-CFRoP.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G6R-ZGL2] (“The SASB Standards are designed primarily
to facilitate disclosure that is useful to investors, lenders, and other creditors for the
purpose of making investment decisions on the basis of these users’ assessments of
short-, medium-, and long-term financial performance and enterprise value . . . .”).
241 See supra Part I.B.3.b.
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But even if SASB’s standards prevail, completion of the ESG
information system would advance democratic values. First, it would
provide some of the information non-investor stakeholders would need.
Second, it would provide a model for a broader system that might later
serve all stakeholders. Third, it could prove the concept of controlling
corporations through stakeholder markets.
Whether voluntary or government-mandated, an effective ESG
information system would provide government with the information
government would need to regulate. But if politics renders government
incapable of requiring CSR, market repurposing is the second-best
solution. The current system gives the public almost no control over CSR.
IV. PARALLEL PROCESSES
CSR is an idea whose time has come. “Society is demanding that
companies, both public and private, serve a social purpose.”242 Building
an ESG information system based on voluntary participation is just one
of several possible ways to repurpose the corporation. Others include
mandatory CSR reporting, mandatory CSR improvement, changing the
law governing corporate purpose, giving employees the right to elect
directors, mutual fund pass-through voting, lawsuits to compel SASB
reporting, and the adoption of norms and stewardship codes.
CSR advocates are pursuing all these reforms. Each reform
complements the others by making their adoption more likely.243 The
plethora of CSR proposals described in this Part have attracted a wide
array of supporters. Because all seek the same result, the supporters of
all are pushing in the same direction. Those efforts are changing
corporations’ expectations and strategies. CSR now appears inevitable.
A. Regulation
The most likely regulation of CSR would be the imposition of
additional mandatory reporting. For example, Professor Cynthia
Estlund has argued for the mandatory disclosure of a variety of the

242 Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter
(last visited Sept. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HQ3H-AN7E].
243 See Yan & Zhang, supra note 130, at 64 (“[S]ome legal mechanisms such as
disclosure requirements under corporate law may in turn strengthen the market force
in disciplining corporate behaviour by increasing transparency.”).
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“terms and conditions” of employment.244 Professors Florian Möslein
and Karsten Engsig Sørensen would require that companies “formulate
and disclose more specific targets [for their sustainability efforts],
outlining how they will achieve them, and finally they should report on
what has been achieved.”245
The promulgation and acceptance of GRI and SASB standards has
made it easier for the SEC to impose mandatory CSR reporting. Before
GRI and SASB, the SEC would have faced a several-year project to
develop reporting standards. The issue of whether to mandate reporting
would have been debated in the abstract. Today, the SEC could mandate
CSR reporting simply by adopting GRI’s, SASB’s, or TCFD’s
standards.246 The debate could address the standard set chosen instead
of all forms CSR reporting might take. If the SEC adopts GRI’s or SASB’s
standards, the SEC presumably will assume the authority to amend
them.
Once corporations are reporting, it will be easier to mandate CSR
improvements. Congress would have data quantifying the need for
improvements, and each of the corporations affected would be in a
position to calculate the impact of the legislation on it.
B. Changing the Corporation’s Purpose
The law of Delaware and perhaps that of a few other states facially
requires that corporations maximize shareholder wealth.247 Numerous
commentators propose to eliminate that requirement and substitute a
requirement that corporations also serve the interests of stakeholders
244 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 351 passim (2011) (arguing for mandatory disclosure of work-related information
about corporations).
245 Florian Möslein & Karsten Engsig Sørensen, Sustainable Corporate Governance: A
Way Forward 7 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 583/2021, 2021),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/mosleinsorrensenfinal
.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB4L-VL9Z].
246 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RECOMMENDATION OF THE SEC INVESTOR ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
RELATING
TO
ESG
DISCLOSURE
10
(May
21,
2020),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/esg-disclosure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TEP6-8D5N] (mentioning those three as “useful standards” that “may
help shape [the SEC’s] thinking”). The reference is puzzling because the Task Force on
Climate-related Financial Disclosure (“TCFD”) has not published standards. See TASK
FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/ (last
visited Sept. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/264T-XCLH].
247 E.g., Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 2017 WL
1437308, at *18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017) (“[T]he fiduciary relationship requires that
the directors . . . maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the
benefit of the providers of presumptively permanent equity capital . . . .”).

1504

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:1445

and perhaps the public.248 That change would not significantly increase
directors’ ability to serve the other stakeholders’ interests. Directors
already have virtually unlimited discretion to provide benefits to
stakeholders in the amounts the directors believe to be in the
corporation’s long-run interest.249 The long-run interest condition is
toothless because the business judgment rule presumes it is satisfied.250
Directors can do whatever they choose, provided only that they refrain
from announcing that they are providing stakeholder benefits that they
don’t believe to be in the corporation’s best interests.
Legal recognition of stakeholder and public interests in corporations
would, however, have symbolic importance. Reforms that required CSR
reporting and improvement could be argued to, and adopted by, boards
on their merits. The reforms would not have to be phrased to satisfy the
convoluted fiction that they were in the interests of “the corporation
and its shareholders.”251
Professors Stavros Gadinis and Amelia Miazad propose that the
Delaware courts declare that the failure to provide adequate staff and
resources to the “ESG function” breaches the directors’ duty of good
faith:
248 E.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. §5(c)(1)(A) (2018)
(“[D]irectors . . . shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the . . . corporation
in a manner that — (i) seeks to create a general public benefit; and (ii) balances the
pecuniary interests of the shareholders . . . with the best interests of persons that are
materially affected by the conduct of the . . . corporation.”); Kent Greenfield, Defending
Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1043, 1061 (2008) (“[W]e should
extend [legal] protections to stakeholders.”); Amir N. Licht, Stakeholder Impartiality: A
New Classic Approach for the Objectives of the Corporations 23-24 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 476/2019, 2019) (“[D]irectors . . . will be obliged
to treat the company’s stakeholders impartially when they make business judgments in
the best interest of the company as a whole — an obligation that will be discharged by
considering the interests of the company’s various stakeholders.”); Jaap Winter,
Addressing the Crisis of the Modern Corporation: The Duty of Societal Responsibility
of the Board 11 (Apr. 13, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3574681 [https://perma.cc/7LXN-426A] (“Corporate law
could formulate a duty of the board and the directors to ensure that the corporation acts
responsibly with a view to the interests of society and the way it uses investor, human,
social and natural capital.”).
249 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 770-71 (2005) (“[U]nder the business judgment rule, courts are extraordinarily
willing to sustain decisions that apparently sacrifice profits (at least in the short run)
on the ground that they may conceivably maximize profits (at least in the long run).”).
250 LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note , at 335 (“The [business judgment] rule creates
a rebuttable presumption that in making decisions, the managers have not breached
their duties of care or loyalty.”).
251 See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99
(Del. 2007).
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Delaware courts should recognize that, by failing to build up
their companies’ ESG function, directors and officers are
exposing their shareholders to increased risks. If that failure is
due to bad faith, it should be treated as a violation of the duty
of loyalty. To clear the bad faith hurdle, boards should ensure
that the company has a well-established ESG function. This
would consist of an internal governance mechanism with
adequate staff and resources, a well-defined substantive scope,
and, most importantly, a robust effort for outreach to
stakeholders.252
Similarly, Professor Kishanthi Parella would place on the corporation
a duty, when contracting, to “take into account the interests of
stakeholders when performance of the contract creates a risk of physical
harm to them.”253
C. Changing Who Elects Directors
Some reformers propose that employees share voting control with
shareholders. Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act
would allow employees to elect forty percent of the directors of any
corporation with over one billion dollars in revenues.254 Professors
Grant Hayden and Matthew Bodie have proposed several alternatives
under which employees would participate in the election of directors.255
Professor Michael Simkovic proposes to allocate additional votes to
shareholders who are natural persons.256
D. Pass-through Voting
Mutual funds are a form of investment in which numerous investors
purchase shares of a fund and the fund purchases the shares of

252 Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L.
REV. 1401, 1414 (2020) (citation omitted).
253 Kishanthi Parella, Contractual Stakeholderism, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 25), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3821887
[https://perma.cc/K294-ZN6D].
254 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6(b)(1) (2018) (“Not less
than 2⁄5 of the directors of a United States corporation shall be elected by the employees
of the United States corporation . . . .”).
255 Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder
Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419, 2473-77 (2020).
256 Michael Simkovic, Natural Person Shareholder Voting 39 (Mar. 2021)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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numerous public corporations.257 The result is a high level of
investment diversification. Each investor in a mutual fund is the
beneficial owner of infinitesimal slices of the shares of hundreds or
thousands of corporations. Mutual fund investors include about fortysix percent of American households.258
The funds are fiduciaries, each obligated to vote the shares it holds in
a manner consistent with the best interests of the fund and the fund’s
shareholders.259 Some mutual funds believe those interest are to
maximize the shares’ values.260 The effect is that those funds vote the
fund investors’ money for corporations to maximize shareholder
wealth.
Under current law and practice, mutual funds vote the shares the fund
holds.261 “Pass-through voting” literally means that the holders of the
fund’s shares would vote the shares the fund holds. Pass through voting
in that sense is not practical because each investor might have to vote
in hundreds of elections each year. The proposed reform is that mutual
funds should instead vote the shares they hold in accord with the actual

257 Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An
Evaluation of Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 930 (1994) (“Mutual
funds, a type of collective investment vehicle, pool money from public investors and
invest in a variety of securities. In simplified terms, they ‘split ownership into capital
supplying and investment, and professionalize[] the investment function.’” (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on
Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 564 (1981))).
258 Share of Households Owning Mutual Funds in the United States from 1980 to 2020,
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/246224/mutual-funds-owned-by-americanhouseholds/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/D8BN-8N4H].
259 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 270, 274) (“An investment adviser voting proxies on behalf
of a fund, therefore, must do so in a manner consistent with the best interests of the
fund and its shareholders.” (citations omitted)).
260 See,
e.g.,
Larry
Fink’s
2017
Letter
to
CEOs,
BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2017-larry-fink-ceo-letter
(last visited Sept. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/MTY4-NFPS] (“As a fiduciary, I write on
[our investors’] behalf to advocate governance practices that BlackRock believes will
maximize long-term value creation for their investments.”).
261 The practice is changing, but only with respect to the largest investors, most of
whom are funds that hold the shares for the benefit of others. Dawn Lim, BlackRock to
Give Up Some Voting Power: Big Clients for Some $1.5 Trillion in Assets Will Be Able to
Vote on Shareholder Proposals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2021, at B10 (“Starting in 2022,
BlackRock says its large investors can vote themselves on everything from who sits on
boards to executive pay to what companies should disclose on greenhouse-gas
emissions.”).
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preferences of the funds’ investors.262 The funds could inexpensively
determine the preferences of their investors by survey, using
sampling.263 The shares voted in accord with a single set of fund
shareholder preferences might be those of hundreds or thousands of
corporations. Given the overwhelming popularity of CSR, for nearly
every fund the preferences voted would include CSR reporting and
improvement.264
In the aggregate, mutual funds own sufficiently large minorities of the
shares of most public corporations effectively to control them.265 Thus,
mutual funds’ adoption of pass-through voting might alone repurpose
public corporations.
Even after mutual funds adopted pass-through voting, corporate
voting procedures might remain a significant problem. Corporate law
does not allow shareholders to make corporate policy. Instead, it gives

262 See Caleb Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund
Giants, 79 MD. L. REV. 954, 990, 1005 (2020) (proposing general, annually updated
voting instructions from investors); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure
of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 843, 893
(2009) (“[T]he real owners of publicly traded institutions should have the right to forgo
profit in the short or long term in the interest of other principles. Giving the true
investors a voice on shareholder resolutions, governance, or otherwise is a step in that
direction.”). Lynn Stout and Sergio Gramitto propose creation of a Universal Fund
Portfolio with shares owned by the public and voted on the shareholders’ behalf by
proxy advisors chosen by shareholder vote. Lynn Stout & Sergio Gramitto, Corporate
Governance as Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 551,
564-65 (2018).
263 Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 IOWA J. CORP. L. 217, 238 (2018)
(suggesting that funds use survey sampling to determine their investors’ preferences).
264 See Taub, supra note , at 893 (“[W]hen we look to these underlying investors,
they say overwhelmingly (in their capacities as citizens, neighbors, people of faith, and
so on) that they do not want to support genocide, or environmental damage, or poor
labor standards.”); see also Corporate Social Responsibility: Reputation and Consumers —
Part 2, REASON DIGIT. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://reasondigital.com/blog/corporate-socialresponsibility-and-the-consumer/ [https://perma.cc/YWY9-X6VR] (“96% of [500]
survey participants agreed that it is important for companies to have good social and
environmental policies.”); Toby A. Cox, How Corporate Social Responsibility Influences
Buying Decisions, CLUTCH (Jan. 7, 2019), https://clutch.co/pr-firms/resources/howcorporate-social-responsibility-influences-buying-decisions
[https://perma.cc/Z48E3SLK] (survey of 420 consumers finding that “[f]ewer people (44%) say price is among
the most important attributes of a company compared to environmentally-friendly
business practices (71%), social responsibility (68%), and giving back to the local
community (68%)”).
265 For example, three fund managers, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street,
together own more than twenty percent of the shares of S&P 500 companies. Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 724 (2019).
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the authority to manage corporations to the boards of directors.266
Shareholders have the right to elect the directors, but not to require the
directors to pursue a pro-CSR agenda.267
The work-around for that problem is for the mutual fund to announce
what it wants the directors to do and then vote against the reelection of
any director who does not do it. The largest funds already use this workaround.268 Votes against reelection do not directly remove directors
from office, but as a practical matter, corporations find it easier to do
the shareholders’ bidding than to go to war with them.269 War could
result in a proxy fight that would remove the directors from office. In
essence, pass-through voting would simultaneously threaten directors
in virtually all large, public corporations with removal from office if
they failed to implement mutual fund investors’ CSR preferences.
Completion of the ESG information system and the adoption of passthrough voting would align the legal power of directors with the market
power of the Potential Stakeholders. Both would favor CSR reporting
and improvement.
Imposition of the same CSR obligations on huge numbers of
corporations would be both the strength and weakness of the reform.
Imposition’s strength is that it would assure the corporations a level
playing field. Those spending money on CSR would not be at a cost
disadvantage, because their competitors would be forced to incur the
same costs.
Some scholars argue that a mutual fund’s imposition of the same CSR
obligations on all corporations in which the mutual fund invests would
constitute an antitrust violation.270 Mutual funds are an example of
“horizontal shareholding” — ownership of the shares of corporations
that are supposed to compete with one another. Horizontal

266 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”);
see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[T]he business and
affairs of the corporation [shall be] managed by or under the direction of[] its board of
directors . . . .”).
267 See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008)
(“[I]t is well established that stockholders of a corporation subject to the DGCL may
not directly manage the business and affairs of the corporation . . . .”).
268 See supra Part I.B.2.
269 See LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note 47, at 244-45 (explaining the use of
shareholder resolutions as a work around).
270 E.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268, 131617 (2016) (“[T]he problem of horizontal shareholding is pervasive across our economy
because institutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street now
own around 80% of all stock in S&P 500 corporations.”).
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shareholding has antitrust implications because some research purports
to show that it leads to less competition and higher prices in product
markets.271 But the empirical showing is disputed,272 the legal
arguments speculative, and the function of mutual funds so
important273 that the antitrust argument is not a serious threat to mutual
funds or to pass-through voting.274 The antitrust theme does, however,
provide a rhetorical counter to the pass-through voting proposal.
E. Stewardship Codes
Stewardship codes are laws or voluntary sets of principles that guide
and legitimize activist shareholder participation in corporate
governance. They “reflect the view that engagement by institutional
investors is an integral part of any corporate governance system.”275 The
codes are relevant here because some of them expressly endorse CSR
reporting.276 All the codes provide additional paths and justifications for
mutual fund advocacy of CSR reporting.

271 Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust
Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2032 (2018) (“A growing empirical body of evidence
suggests that horizontal shareholding has led to higher prices in product markets.”).
272 E.g., Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, The Case for Doing Nothing About
Institutional Investors’ Common Ownership of Small Stakes in Competing Firms, 13 VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 213, 237-48 (2019) (challenging the findings of the underlying research).
273 Mutual funds hold twenty-two percent of U.S. corporate equity. Share of Market
Securities Held by Mutual Funds in the United States in 2020, by Security Type, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/255547/percentage-of-total-market-securities-heldby-investment-companies/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HPF2-GYM4].
274 See Keith Klovers & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Common Ownership: Solutions in
Search of a Problem, in 2 STANDING UP FOR CONVERGENCE AND RELEVANCE IN ANTITRUST
LIBER AMICORUM 261, 275-77 (Nicolas Charbit & Thomas Moretto eds., 2019) (noting
that U.S. antitrust enforcers remain unconvinced and that “the current empirical
evidence that common ownership causes anticompetitive harm is limited and hotly
disputed”).
275 Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship
Codes, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497, 506 (2018).
276 Compare Stewardship Principles, INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., https://isgframework.
org/stewardship-principles/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/JA5V-4KNW]
(stewardship principles that make no mention of ESG), with INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE
NETWORK, GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES 11 (2016), https://www.icgn.org/sites/
default/files/ICGNGlobalStewardshipPrinciples.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q3X9-QC9N]
(“Principle 6: Investors should promote the long-term performance and sustainable
success of companies and should integrate material environmental, social and
governance (ESG) factors in stewardship activities.”).
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Suing to Compel SASB Reporting

Paul Rissman and Diana Kearney argue persuasively that
promulgation of the SASB standards legally obligates the largest
institutional investors to require the corporations whose stock they
hold to report to those standards.277 Their argument is that the fund
managers, “including six of the 10 largest asset managers globally,”
participated in drafting the SASB standards.278 By doing so, the fund
managers accepted SASB’s premise that SASB was identifying the
information legally material to investors.279 Thus, the fund managers
have a fiduciary duty of care to their investors — the holders of the
funds’ shares — to vote the shares owned by the fund, and otherwise
engage with the corporations, to require the corporations to provide
that material information through SASB reporting.280 BlackRock, State
Street, and others seem to be doing exactly that.281 Consistent with this
Article’s argument, Rissman and Kearney predict that, if their argument
prevails in court, “corporations [may] become actual champions of
liberty and ecological health.”282
G. Social Norm Building
Numerous scholars and organizations have stressed the importance
of norm building to repurposing corporations.283 For example, the
British Academy sought to change the purpose of the corporation by
publishing eight “principles for purposeful business.”284 In essence, the
277 Paul Rissman & Diana Kearney, Rise of the Shadow ESG Regulators: Investment
Advisers, Sustainability Accounting, and Their Effects on Corporate Social Responsibility,
49 ENV’T L. REP. 10155 passim (2019).
278 Id. at 10156.
279 See id. (describing SASB as “an organization conceived explicitly to formulate
standards that comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of materiality”).
280 See id. (“We argue, however, that by endorsing the materiality of the standards,
these specific investors will have created for themselves an extension of their fiduciary
duty of care to their customers: an implied duty to ask for, and evaluate, reporting that
satisfies the standards.”).
281 See Aggarwal et al., supra note 120, at 151; Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala to
Board Members, supra note 29; Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs, supra note 29.
282 Rissman & Kearney, supra note 277, at 10187.
283 E.g., Beate Sjåfjell & Mark B. Taylor, Clash of Norms: Shareholder Primacy vs.
Sustainable Corporate Purpose, 13 INT’L & COMPAR. CORP. L.J. 40, 45 (2020) (“Law is
most effective when it is designed to leverage the regulatory power of other modes of
regulation: markets, social norms and architecture.”).
284 THE BRIT. ACAD., PRINCIPLES FOR PURPOSEFUL BUSINESS 18-29 (2019),
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/publications/future-of-the-corporation-principlesfor-purposeful-business [https://perma.cc/CC3H-TX7S].
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principles recommend a change in the law to require corporations to
state their purposes and to impose “high duties of engagement, loyalty
and care . . . to public interests where [the corporations] perform
important public functions.”285 The remaining six principles are
exhortations for the corporations to adopt practices voluntarily.
CONCLUSIONS
The ESG information system may be operational in just a few years.
A substantial portion of public corporations will then continually report
hundreds of measurements of their CSR performances in the same
standardized formats. Those performances will be compared, analyzed,
rated, and ranked. If SASB standards prevail, the information collected
will be tailored solely to the needs of investors. But the information,
ratings, and rankings will be available to all Potential Stakeholders, who
will use them to determine what corporations they should deal with and
on what terms. If GRI standards prevail, the information collected will
be tailored to the needs of all Potential Stakeholders.
Repurposing will depend on Potential Stakeholder buy-in to the idea
that they can control corporations and that it is legitimate for them to
do so. The likelihood of that buy-in is high, however, because
repurposing the corporation is the Potential Stakeholders’ best hope for
achieving a sustainable, reasonably democratic, and fair society.
Potential Stakeholders’ use of ESG information in their decision
making will confer ESG Benefit on high-CSR performing corporations.
If that ESG Benefit is large enough, more corporations will report to
more standards, and corporations will begin repurposing themselves to
attract more ESG Benefit. If the prospect of ESG Benefit is not large
enough to cause widespread reporting, the government will almost
certainly mandate ESG reporting.
The repurposing of the corporation may seem like a magic trick. The
creation of an ESG information system converts the shareholder wealth
maximizing corporation into its opposite: a generator of social benefit.
The illusion results from the failure of corporate law scholars to see that
the modern corporation has always been controlled through the market
decisions of stakeholders as well as through its formal governance
process. The ESG information system will merely improve the
functioning, and thus the influence, of those stakeholder markets. Prior
stakeholder models of the corporation have missed the existence of
these markets by conceptualizing stakeholders as groups that
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allegorically negotiate based on their financial interests, instead of as
individuals who make market decisions based on their values.286
The corporation’s failure to deliver the benefits that stakeholders and
the public want from the corporation results from the lack of a system
that can measure and reward the corporations’ CSR performances.
Instead, corporations focus on what can be measured: financial
performance. Corporations deliver the false appearance of social
responsibility, externalize their social costs, and leave it to society to
clean up after them.
The ESG information system will measure the externalization of a
variety of social costs.287 Once those externalizations are measured,
Potential Stakeholders could shun the externalizers, or government
could reimpose the externalized costs on the externalizers.288 Either
course could reduce or eliminate future externalizations.
To serve any of its stakeholders, the corporation must survive, and to
survive, it must meet its financial obligations. But aside from that, there
are no inherent limitations on the purposes to which the business
corporation can be applied. In the aggregate, the Potential Stakeholders
control all of the resources corporations need to operate. By their
market choices, the Potential Stakeholders can make the corporation’s
purpose whatever they want it to be.

286 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 320 (1999) (“[S]hareholders, managers, employees, and other
groups that make firm-specific investments yield control over both those investments
and the resulting output to the corporation’s internal governing hierarchy.”).
287 See generally William Hubbard, Note, Communicating Entitlements: Property and
the Internet, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 401, 417 (2004) (“For a legal regime to impose a
price, however, the regime must be able to adequately measure the externalized costs.”).
288 Christensen et al., supra note 100 (“[B]road CSR disclosures make firms
internalize the (social) costs of their impacts on the environment and society and
eventually lead to changes in how they operate.”). See generally What Is the Difference
Between Private and Social Costs, and How Do They Relate to Pollution and Production?,
FED. RSRV. BANK S.F. (Nov. 2002), https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctorecon/2002/november/private-social-costs-pollution-production/ [https://perma.cc/3KBSR2EB] (“Society is better off when production and consumption decisions are based on
social costs that include external costs, because external costs really do matter in the
real world.”).

